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ABSTRACT
A COMPARISON OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ILLEGALITY AS DEVELOPED BY 
THE COURTS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF MALADMINISTRATION AS 
DEVELOPED BY THE LOCAL OMBUDSMAN
submitted for the degree of Bachelor of Philosophy, March 1997,
by
Thomas Ian McLeod LLB BA, Solicitor of the Supreme Court,
This thesis compares the basis on which the courts, operating through the judicial review 
procedure, hold local authorities' actions and inactions to bo unlawful, with the basis on 
which the local ombudsman (commissioner for local administration) makes findings of 
maladministration in respect of local authorities.
It begins with an account of the origins, nature and purpose of both judicial review 
and ombudsmanship, and considers aspects of the procedure by which each operates. It 
proceeds principally through an examination of the primary sources contained in the law 
reports and the local ombudsman reports, placing this material within its common law and 
statutory context.
It concludes that although there are some significant differences between the two 
avenues of redress, there is a very large degree of overlap in terms of the kind of grievances 
with which each deals, and the principles which each applies
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INTRODUCTION
The office of local ombudsman was created by the Local Government Act 1974 in order to 
provide an avenue for redress against local authorities who were guilty of maladministration 
causing injustice, in much the same way as the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 had created 
the office of Parliamentary Commissioner in order to provide similar redress against central 
government.
This thesis compares the avenue of redress through the local ombudsman in England and 
Wales with that provided by the courts by way of judicial review. More particularly, emphasis is 
placed on the extent to which the grounds for seeking redress are common to both avenues, and, 
even more particularly, on the extent to which, in practice, the local ombudsman is inhibited by 
s.26(6)(c) of the Local Government Act 1974, which precludes the local ombudsman from 
intervening where the complainant hz^ an alternative remedy through the courts, unless the local 
. ombudsman is satisfied that it would not be reasonable to expect the complainant to pursue that
remedy.
There is an extensive literature on judicial review and a substantial literature on the office 
of ombudsman generally, although there is significantly less on the local ombudsman. 
FurthCTmore, this literature does not address the specific topic of this thesis. It has not been 
possible, therefore, to relate the argument of this thesis directly to the existing literature. Instead, 
the zqiproach adopted is to set out the nature, and functions of, and the grounds for seeking, 
judicial review, together with a parallel study of the local ombudsman.
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The judicial review material is informed principally by the decisions of the courts 
themselves, supplemented by a number of leadmg textbooks, including Craig S Administrative 
Law, Wade and Forsyth's Administrative Law and de Smith, Woolf and JoweU's Judicial Review 
o f Administrative Action, which is widely regarded as the leading textbook in the field. The 
parallel analysis of the local ombudsman material has been based principally on the local 
ombudsman's reports themselves, read in the context of the Local Government Act 1974 (as 
amended) which established the office, together with the Guide to the Local Government 
Ombudsman Service (which although a commercial publication was initially written, and has since 
been edited, by successive local ombudsmen), and other texts including in particular Scneviratne's 
Ombudsmen in the Public Sector and Logie and Watchman's study of the Scottish context The 
Local Ombudsman. Additionally, reference has been made to the local ombudsman's Annual 
Reports and the Guidance Notes which the local ombudsman has issued consequent on the 
extension of his fimctions by the Local Government and Housing Act 1989.
The material on local ombudsman reports has been drawn fi-om the reports themselves. 
These reports are not widely distributed, but since 1988 the journal Local Government Review 
(which was re-titled Local Government Review Reports in 1994, and merged into Justice o f the 
Peace in 1996) has generally carried one report a week. The present writer has edited these 
reports throughout this period, in which connexion he has received every local ombudsman report 
which has been published. Additionally, he edited a selection of the reports which were published 
in 1993 under the title Local Government Ombudsman: A Casebook. Throughout this thesis, 
therefore, local ombudsman reports are referred to by their official identifier, with additional 
citations where reports have appeared in the journals and the casebook mentioned above.
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The cases on judicial review have been drawn from the primary sources contained in 
various series of law reports (including Administrative Law Reports which has been edited by the 
present writer since it was established in 1989). Law reports are widely available and a.ccess to 
them therefore presents no problems.
Throughout this thesis, the comparison of redress through the courts and through the local 
ombudsman proceeds by examining the courts first and then the loczd ombudsman, since the office 
of local ombudsman was created on the premise that there were many cases where, in practice, 
judicial review was an inadequate remedy.
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CHAPTER 1
THE ORIGINS, PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
OMBUDSMANSHIP
A: INTRODUCTION
This chapter will compare and contrast the origins and purposes of judicial review and 
ombudsmanship, together with the types of grievance which are susceptible to each 
mechanism of redress. The grounds on which applications for judicial review, and 
complaints to the local ombudsman, may be made are considered in outline in chapter 2, 
and in detail in chapters 3,4, and 5.
The argument of this chapter is that although the processes of judicial review 
and ombudsmanship share a concern with the quality of the decision-makmg process rather 
than with the content of the decision, there are nevertheless important differences between 
them in terms of their purpose and scope, as well as - more obviously - their origins.
B; THE ORIGINS, PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
1. The Origins of Judicial Review
The 1977 revision of 0.53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court introduced a unified 
procedure to .be used for all applications for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and some 
applications for injunctions and declarations,' and referred to that procedure as an 
explication fo r judicial review. However, the phrase and the relevant remedies all enjoy
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much longer pedigrees than this simple statement may suggest /  For example, the modem 
use of certiorari can be traced back at least as far as the seventeenth century when it was 
first used to control the exercise of statutory powers/ Furthermore, the phrase yW/c/a/ 
review has enjoyed wide currency since at least 1959 when the first edition of de Smith's 
seminal work on Judicial Review o f Administrative Action was published/
2. The Purpose of Judicial Review
In essence, the purpose of judicial review is to control the exercise of governmental 
powers. It follows that the courts have to resolve - or, at least, maintain equihbrium within 
- one of the most basic tensions implicit within the British constitution, namely the 
interaction between the rule of law and the separation of powers (or, as Lord Scarman put 
it, in Duport Steels Ltd v. Sirs,^  the separation oifunctions). The rapid growth of the use 
of judicial review in recent years* is merely a reflection of the feet that applicants have 
increasingly argued, and the court has often accepted, that without judicial intervention 
there will be unacceptable abuses of power. For example in / t  v. Panel on Take-Overs and 
Mergers ex parte Datapn p lc f where the court was considering the activities of an 
unincorporated association, which lacked legal personahty and which had been created by 
the City of London for the purposes of its self regulatory functions in relation to take overs 
atiH mergers. Sir John Donaldson MR spoke of the need for the court to "recognize the
realities of executive power".
The fundamental characteristic of judicial review is that it is supervisory rather 
appellate. In other words, unlike an appellate body which can generally substitute its
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own decision for that against which an appeal is being made/ a court which hears an 
application for judicial review has - at most - the power to quash the decision and remit the 
matter to the decision-maker for reconsideration. In many cases it will content itself with 
either a declaration, or even a simple statement that the judgment of the court will itself be 
sufficient, without the need for any formal order ^
The distinction between appeal and review may be basic, but it is nevertheless a 
matter which the courts frequently feel conq>elled to emphasise. For example, in Chief 
Constable o f North Wales Police v. Evof/w,'® which involved a challenge to the exercise of a 
chief constable's internal disciplinary functions. Lord Brightman commented adversely on 
the Court of Appeal's approach to the case, saying:
"There is ... a wider point than the injustice of the decision-^making process of the 
chief constable. With profound respect to the Court of Appeal, I dissent from the 
view that "Not only must [the officer who is subject to the disciplinary proceedings] 
be given a fair hearing, but the decision itself must be feir and reasonable.' If that 
statement of the law passed into authority without comment, it would in my opinion 
transform, and wrongly transform, the remedy of judicial review. Judicial review, as 
the words imply, is not an appeal from  a decision, but a review o f the manner in 
which the decision was made. The statement of law which I have quoted implies 
that the court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision-making 
process but also on the correctness of the decision itself." (Emphasis added.)
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Injudicial review, therefore, the court is seeking to confine inferior 
decision-makers" within the limits of their lawful authority, whilst seeking to avoid 
imposing its own view as to the desirable outcome of the decision-making process in terms 
of the actual decision."
3. The Scope of Judicial Review
(a) Situations Susceptible to Judicial Review
Judicial review relates to the exercise of powers within the field of public law generally, 
though the focus of this thesis is on the relationship between judicial review and the rather 
more limited sphere of responsibility \riiich Parliament has allocated to the local 
ombudsman.
The reform of 0.53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court in 1977 clearly indicated 
that the uniform procedure which it introduced must be used in applications for certiorari, 
prohibition and mandamus and could be used in applications for declarations and 
injunctions." However, in the seminal case of O'Reilly v. M achnanf* the House of Lords 
established that, despite the permissive language of 0.53 in respect of the use of the judicial 
review procedure for declarations and injunctions, all challenges involving matters of public 
law must normally be brought by way of judicial review, irrespective of the remedy being 
sought. Clearly, therefore, the dividing line between public wâ:private law becomes of 
crucial importance, and consequently it is not surprising that this has proved to be a fertile 
field for judicial development.
BPhil - Illegality and Maladministration - p.4
In Council o f Civil Service Unions v. Minister fo r the Civil Service^^ (commonly 
known as GCHQ because the case arose from a ban on trade union membership by workers 
at the Government Communication Headquarters), Lord Diplock said:
"The subject matter [of an application for judicial review] is a decision ... or else a 
refusal to make a decision.
"To qualify as a subject for judicial review the decision must have consequences 
which afreet some persons (or body of persons) other than the decision-maker, 
although it may affect him too. It must afreet such other person either:
(a) by altering rights or obligations of that person which are enforceable by 
or against him in private law; or
(b) by depriving him of some benefit or advantage, which either
(i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy 
and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to 
enjoy until there has been communicated to him some rational 
ground for withdrawing it on which he has been given an 
opportunity to comment; or
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(ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker will not be 
withdra^vn Wthout giving him first an opportunity of advancing 
reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn
"For a decision to be susceptible to judicial review the decision-maker must be 
empowered by public law (and not merely . . . by agreement between private parties)
to make decisions that, if validly made, will lead to administrative action or
abstention from action by an authority endowed by law with executive powers, 
which have one or other of the consequences mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph."'*
Lord Diplock was not, of course, intending to undermine the basic proposition 
that some matters are, in their very nature, non-justiciable. Indeed, Lord Rpskill made the 
point expressly, when he said that the right of challenge was not unqualified but
"must depend upon the subject matter of the prerogative power Prerogative 
powers such as those relating to the making of treaties, the defence of the realm, the 
prerogative of mercy, the grant of honours, the dissolution of ParliamCTt, and the 
appointment of ministers, as well as others are not, I think, susceptible to judicial 
review because thoir nature and subject matter are such as not to be amenable to the 
judicial process."
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For some, time, the court developed the idea that the key to the distinction 
between public and private law was whether the decision-making fonction in question could 
be said to have a governmental quality. For example, in /Î. v. Chief Rabbi ex parte 
Wachmarm,^  ^where the issue involved disciplinary action taken by a religious authority 
(which was ultimately held to be non-justiciable in any event), Simon Brown J said that in 
order to attract the court's jurisdiction in judicial review,
"there must be not merely a public but potentially a governmental interest in the 
decision-making power in question . . . "
At that time, the case-law indicated that a body's fonctions were sufficiently 
governmental for the present purposes provided that, if the body did not already exist, the 
government would feel compelled to create a body to perform its fonctions." More 
recently, however, the court, has resiled from this position.
Jr R . v. Disciplinary Committee o f the Jockey Club ex parte Aga Aifeow," the 
applicant for judicial review was not only a major racehorse owner and breeder, but also the 
leader of a substantial religious sect. A routine dope test on one of his horses which had 
won a major race proved to be positive, as a result of which the horse was disqualified and 
the owner was fined. Even though there was no suggestion that either the owner or the 
trainer had been responsible for the feet that the horse was doped, the owner felt that the 
outcome of the disciplinary proceedings reflected adversely on his reputation, as well as 
involving him in a significant financial loss through the forfeiture of the prize money and the
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diminution in the value of the horse. On the owner's application for judicial review, the 
club took a preliminary point, arguing that it was a private and domestic body, which was 
independent of government, and that therefore it was not subject to judicial review. The 
Kgh Court upheld this argument, as did the Court of Appeal
More particularly. Sir Thomas Bingham MR acknowledged that the club's 
regulatory fimctions were of such importance that, but fi>r the club's existence, the 
government would probably have to create a public body to perform them. Nevertheless, 
the court held that when viewed fi*om the perspective of its origin, its history, its 
constitution and its membership, the club could not be said to be a public body, and its 
powers could not be said to be governmental. The club's jurisdiction over people such as 
the applicant arose fi-om an agreement between the parties, which gave rise to private rights 
which were enforceable through the private law remedies of injunctions, declarations and 
damages. It followed, therefore, that judicial review was not available.
In the same case Hoffinann U  implicitly acknowledged that, in pursuing the 
governmental test, the courts had been seeking to provide remedies in oases where there 
was a perceived need for remedies to e?dst. However, he went on explicitly to reject that 
qaproach:
"I do not think that one should try to patch up the remedies available against 
domestic bodies by pretending that they are organs of government. "
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In coming to this conclusion, he treated the slightly earlier decision of the High 
Court in R  v. Football Association Ltd. ex parte Football League Ltd as being "highly 
persuasive". In that case, which involved a dispute over a proposal to create a Premier 
League of association football clubs. Rose J said:
"Despite [the Association's] virtually monopolistic powers and the importance of its 
decisions to many members of the public who are not contractually bound to it, it is, 
in my judgment, a domestic body whose powers arise from and duties exist in 
private law only...
"I do not find this conclusion unwelcome ... [because] ... to apply to the governing 
body of football. ... principles honed for the control of the abuse of power by . 
government and its creatures would involve what, in today's fashionable parlance, 
would be called a quantum leap. It would also, in my view, for what it is worth, be 
a misapplication of increasingly scarce judicial resources.". .
Briefly, therefore, the current position is that judicial review will be available 
only where the court feels this to be necessary in order to protect the subject. It follows that 
judicial review will not be available where there are legally enforceable rights in private law; 
or, to put it another way, judicial review is a remedy of last resort.
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(b) The Grounds for Applying for Judicial Review
Moving on from the types of situation in which judicial review will be available, it is 
necessary to identify the grounds on which applications for judicial review may be made/' 
The leading, modem, judicial sunimary may be found by returning to the speech of Lord 
Diplock in GOyg "
"One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon which 
administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I 
would call illegality, the second irratiormlity, and the third procedural inxropriety. 
That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course 
of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption of the 
principle o f proportionality which is recognized in the administrative law of several 
of our fellow members of the European Economic Community.
"By illegality ... 1 mean that the decision-maker must understand correctly the 
law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to i t ... By 
irrationality I mean what can now be succinctly referred to as Wednesbury 
unreasonableness^ ... I have described the third head as procedural impropriety 
rather than as feilure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with 
procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is 
because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by on 
administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in
BPhil - Illegality and Maladministration - p. 10
the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even though such 
failure does not involve any denial of natural justice. "
By way of consolidation, and before considering the origins, purpose and scope 
of ombudsmanship (with particular reference, of course, to the local ombudsman), it may be 
said that judicial review is the modem form of a very long-standing common law 
jurisdiction, the purpose of which is to control public law decision makmg processes which 
would not otherwise be subject to judicial supervision. However, in the absence of 
unlawful conduct on the part of the decision- maker, there is no scope for judicial review to 
operate.
D: THE ORIGINS, PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF OMBUDSMANSHIP
1. The Origins of Ombudsmanship
(a) Generally
As Logie and Watchman say .
"Ombudsmen are not a particularly new idea nor, for that matter, even an invention 
of the twentieth century
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More particularly, the office of ombudsman originated in Sweden in 1809, being 
adopted by Finland and Denmark in 1919 and 1954 respectively, before entering the 
English-speaking world by way of New Zealand in 1962. The office of the first British 
ombudsman, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, was created by the 
Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967.“  Further evidence of the international success of 
the ombudsman concept may be derived fi-om the fact that the European Community Treaty 
(the Treaty of Rome 1957) as amended by the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht 
Treaty 1992) required the creation of an ombudsman for the Community /*
(b) The Local Ombudsman
The impetus for extending the ombudsman concept to the field of local government in 
England and Wales can be traced back to 1969 when para. 18 of the report of a committee 
set up by JUSTICE^ concluded that
"The case for an Ombudsman or Ombudsmen of some kind is ... we consider, a 
strong one. What is needed, it is suggested, is an Ombudsman-like institution, to 
carry out, in relation to local government, functions similar to those carried out in 
relation to central government by the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration..."
In due course. Parliament passed the Local Government Act 1974, Part III of 
which^* creates and governs the local ombudsman. The fiict that the local ombudsman is a
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creature of statute does, of course, contrast fim(toentally with the Common Law origins 
of judicial review, since - when coupled with the public nature of his functions - it means 
that he is himself subject to the doctrine of ultra vires, as developed by the courts through
the process of judicial review.
Section 23(1) of the 1974 Act establishes "a body of commissioners to be known 
as the Commission for Local Administration in England" with corresponding provision for 
Wales. (Similar legislation established parallel bodies in Scotland and Northern Ireland.) 
Although the title local ombudsman may suggest that he is concerned only with local 
authorities, s.25(l) of the 1974 Act lists a variety of other bodies, such as Urban 
Development Corporations and the Land Authority for Wales, which fall within his 
jurisdiction. The 1974 Act has been subject to significant amendment, especially by the 
Local Government and Housing Act 1989 in relation to the way in which local authorities 
must deal with Further Reports.”
2. The Purpose of Ombudsmanship
The purpose of ombudsmanship is conceptually quite distinct fi-om that of judicial review, 
being based upon the concept o ï maladministration rather than illegality. The meaning of 
maladministration is considered under the next heading, and the extent to which it overlaps 
with illegality is, of course, the main topic of this thesis,^ but there can be no doubt that 
maladministration is the wider of the two concepts, since it catches many matters which do 
not constitute illegality. In a Further Report on an investigation into a complaint against 
Leicester City Council," the local ombudsman criticised the local authority, who had
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declined to implement his original recommendation on the basis that the conduct 
characterised as maladministration fell short of illegality. In a letter to the local authority's 
chief executive, the local ombudsman said:
"I am not concerned simply with whether acts or omissions are or are not justified 
by law. /  can also concerned with the area o f public morality ... For my part, I 
consider that promises should be kept..." (Emphasis added.)
3. The Scope of the Local Ombudsman's Jurisdiction
(a) Susceptibility to the Local Ombudsmau's Jurisdiction
The basis of the local ombudsman's jurisdiction is contained in s . 26(1) of the 1974 Act, the 
material part of which states:
"Where a written complaint is made by or on behalf of à member of the public who 
claims to have sustained ii^ustice in consequence of maladmimstration in connection 
with action taken by or on behalf of an authority to which this Part of this Act 
applies, being action taken in the exercise of administrative functions of that 
authority, a local commissioner may investigate that complaint."
The next cMpter will consider, inter alia, the extent to which the existence of an 
akemative remedy excludes the local ombudsman's jurisdiction," but at this point it is
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^propriate to summarize Sch, V to the 1974 Act, which specifically excludes complaints 
arising firom certain types of action;
(a) the commencement or conduct of legal proceedings;
(b) action take by a Police Authority in connection with the investigation or 
prevention of crime;
(c) action taken in relation to contractual and commercial transactions, including 
passenger transport, docks and harbours, entertainments, industrial establishments 
and markets, but excluding the acquisition or disposal of land and ceriain other 
statutory fimctions other than the procurement of goods and services;
(d) action relating to personnel matters;
(e) action taken by a local education authority relating to secular or religious 
instruction in, and the conduct, curriculum, internal management and discipline of, 
its schools and colleges;"
(Q various actions taken by specialized bodies, such as the Development Board for 
Rural Wales and Urban Development Corporations.
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Since this provision plainly provides that the loczd ombudsman's jurisdiction is 
limited to complaints relating to administrative functions, it is appropriate to note that in 
R  V. Commissioner fo r Local Administration ex parte Croydon London Borough 
Council^ Woolf U  declined to offer a definition of that phrase, contenting himself simply 
with endorsing the submission of counsel that the statute had been intended to exclude 
legislative fimctions.
In practice, it is clear that the local ombudsman takes a relatively broad view of 
the meaning of administrative functions, and docs become involved into the obscure and 
unsatisfactory distinctions between judicial, quasi judicial and administrative functions/^
2. The Grounds for Complaining to the Local Ombudsman
Once the locW ombudsman has been satisfied as to the basic jurisdictional requirement that 
the conq)lamt arises put of an administrative fimction, there remains the question of 
whether the complainant has sustained injustice in consequence of maladministration.
Injustice may be said, according to the current elaboration of the term by the 
local ombudsman,
- "to cover any level of hurt fi-om damaged feelings or a sense of injustice, to loss of 
or diminution of rights or amenities or damage to property or to loss quantifiable in 
monetary terms " "
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An influential statement on the meaning o f maladminisiration was given by 
Richard Crossman, who was the Minister responsible for the Bill which, on becoming the 
Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, created the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration. Coining what has become known as the "Crossman catalogue" the 
Minister described maladministration as:
"Bias, neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, perversity, turpitude, 
arbitrariness, and so on ""
In the context of the local ombudsman, this statement received explicit judicial 
jqjproval in Lord Denning MR's judgment inÆ V; Commissioner fo r Local Administration 
fo r the North and East Area o f England ex parte City o f Bradford Metropolitan Council}* 
Although it is clear that the catalogue's closing words - "and so on" - disclose an 
intention to be indicative rather than definitive, it is also clear that they are not completely 
open^ded, As Lord Donaldson MR said, in R  v. Local Commissioner ex parte Eastleigh 
Borough Council}^
"All three judges [in the Bradford case] expressed themselves differently but in 
substance each was saying the same thing, namely, that administration and 
maladministration in the context of the work of local authorities concern the 
mnnnmr in which decisions by the authority are reached and the manner in which they 
are or are not implemented. Administration and maladministration have nothing to
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do with the nature, quality or reasonableness o f the decision itself'' (Emphasis 
added.)
It is clear, therefore, that despite their totally separate origins, there is a 
substantial parallel between the jurisdictions of the court and the local ombudsman, with 
both seeking to divorce consideration of the quality of the decision-makmg process from 
consideration of the content of the decision. In reahty, both processes achieve this 
objective to a large extent, although in both cases this proposition is subject to exceptions, 
in the contexts of Wednesbury unreasonableness and perversity or arbitrariness respectively.
However, there are other, more substantial reasons for exercising caution when 
considering such parallel as there is between the courts and the local ombudsman. As 
Woolf LJ said inÆ v, Commissioner fo r Local Administration ex parte Croydon London 
Borough Council *^
"The Commissioner should also have well in mind, even when the holder of the 
office is a distinguished lawyer as is the case here, that his expertise is not the same 
as that of a court of law. Issues as to whether an administrative tribunal has 
properly understood the relevant law and the legal obligations which it is under 
when conducting an enquiry are more appropriate for resolution by the High Court 
than by a Commissioner however eminent."
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Furthermore, ombudsman's reports must be read in the light of the ombudsman's 
function. As Lord Donaldson MR said in the Eastleigh case:*^
"An ombudsman's report is neither a statute nor a judgment, It is a report to the 
council and to the ratepayers of the area. It has to be written in everyday language 
and convey a message. This report has been subjected to a microscopic and 
somewhat legalistic analysis which it was not intended to undergo."
One consequence of this aspect of the local ombudsman's reports is, of course, 
that the use of "everyday language" is likely to increase the difficulty of formulating precise 
principles of maladininistration.
Even where there is clearly both injustice and maladministration arising from an 
administrative function, there remains one fruther, essential element. The local 
ombudsinan's jurisdiction arises only where the iiyustice is consequent upon, and not merely 
subsequent to, the maladministration. This is not only clear from the plain words of s.26(1) 
of the 1974 Act,^ but was also emphasized by the Court of Appeal in the Eastleigh case,*” 
where the local ombudsman investigated a complaint arising out of a local authority's 
insp%tion of a sewer during its construction. He concluded that there had been 
maladministration in the inspection process and that therefore householders who were 
affected by the inadequacy of the sewer had suffered injustice. Although he could not say 
categorically that even a proper inspection would have revealed the sewer's inadequacy, he 
neverÜiclesB recommended that certain remedial works should be undertaken, with the cost
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being shared between the local authority and the householders. In the High Court, Nolan J 
found that the local ombudsman's conclusion on causation could not be sustained, and the 
majority of the Court of Appeal upheld this view.
F: CONCLUSION
It is clear that, despite fundamental differences in their origins, the processes of judicial 
review and ombudsmanship share the basic characteristic of seeking to assess the quality of 
the decision-making process without seeking to assess the quality of the ensuing decision, 
albeit the courts are concerned solely with matters of law, whereas the local ombudsman is 
concerned with the broader area of public morality. There is a further similarity in that the 
courts exclude applications for judicial review in respect of certain types of subjectmatter, 
which are said to be non-justiciable, while the 1974 Act excludes from the local 
ombudsman's jurisdiction complaints arising from certain types of subject-matter.
The next chapter continues the comparison between the two jurisdictions with 
particular reference to the procedural aspects of each.
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* See, p.39, n.22, below, for the nature of each of the remedies; and see p.4, above, 
for the use of 0.53 when applying for injunctions and declarations.
 ^ See, Drewry, Judicial Review: the Historical Background, in Supperstone &
Goudie, (eds). Judicial Review (1992).
 ^ Wade & Forsyth, Administrative Law, 7th ed., 1994, p.307.
 ^ See, currently, the 5th edition, 1994, by de Smith, Woolf and Jowell.
’ [1980] 1 AUER 529.
* The Report of the Law Commission on Administrative Law: Judicial Review and 
Statutory Appeals (Law Com No 226), published in 1994, gives an increase in applications 
for leave to apply for judicial review from 525 to 2089 between 1980 and 1991. In the 
period 1989 to 1995, the Judicial Statistics show an increase in applications for leave to 
apply (apart from those arising from immigration cases and criminal proceedings, neither of 
which categories is relevant to the present thesis) from 905 to 2063, with an increase in 
Unal determination of such applications from 247 to 597
" [1987] I AU ER 564.
* The only exception Ues in the field of appeal by way of case stated, where the 
appeUate court may be Umited to remitting the case for further consideration by the original 
decision-maker. This is expUcable on the basis that, untU the Summary Jurisdiction Act 
1857, the remedy of ce/tïorar/was obtained through appeal by way of case stated - see 
Wade and Forsyth, Administrative Law, 7th ed., 1994, p.731.
 ^ In Æ V. Coventry City Council and Others exporte Phoenix Aviation and Others
(1995)7 Admin LR 597, Simon Brown U  described the latter option as "the way we
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generally deal with it these days". (This comment does not appear in the report of the case, 
having been made in the course of the post-judgment discussion between the bar and the 
bench. Such discussions, which commonly concern the details of matters such as the form 
of relief, costs and leave to appeal, are very seldom reproduced in law reports.)
Chief Constable o f North Wales Police v. Evans [1982] 3 All ER 141.
"  Such decision-makers are usually administrative in nature, but the historical role of
the justices in what is now called local government has resulted in the magistrates' courts 
also being subject to judicial review.
The extent to which this ideal is attainable in practice is a fruitful field for debate, 
but it is beyond the scope of this thesis.
"  Paragraph 1 of 0.53, rule 1 provides that "an application for (a) an order of
mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, or (b) an injunction under section 30 of the Act 
restraining a person from acting in any office in which he is not entitled to act, shallhe 
made by way of an application for judicial review in accordance with the provisions of this 
Order." and subrule 2 provides that "an application for a declaration or an injunction (not 
being an injunction mentioned in paragraph (l)(b)) may be made by way of an application 
for judicial review". (Emphasis added.)
[1982] 3 AUER 1124.
[1984] 3 AUER953.
In aU the circumstances of the case, the court declined to intervene, on the bases 
that the government took the view that the decision had been justified on the grounds of 
national security, and that poUtical judgments of this nature are non-justiciable, but this
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does not detract from the general applicability of Lord Diplock's views. Although the 
category of non-justiciable matters is never closed, in the same case Lord Roskill gave an 
indication of some frmctions which could be so classified, including the use of the Royal 
Prerogative to enter into treaties, to exercise the prerogative of mercy, to grant honours, to 
dissolve Parliament and to appoint ministers.
”  (1991)3 Admin LR 721.
. ** Sec, e.g., R  V. Advertising Standards Authority Ltd cxparte The Insurance Service
pic  (1990) 2 Admin LR 77, where decisions of the Advertising Standards Authority were 
held to be subject to judicial review.
[1993] 2 AUER853.
“  (1992) 4 Admin LR 623.
These wiU be considered in more detaU in chapters 3 ,4  and 5, below.
“  Seen. 14, above.
“  The case o ï Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation
[1947] 2 AU ER 680, with its two doctrines of relevance and reasonableness, is considered 
in more detaU in chapter 3.
^  The Local Ombudsman, \990, p.1:
^  The train of events culminating in the passing of the Act is described fiiUy by
Stacey, in The British Ombudsmen, 1971.
“  Article 13 8(e) EC Treaty, inserted by art G(41) Treaty on European Union.
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The committee was chaired by Professor J.F. Gamer and is therefore commonly 
referred to as the Gamer Committee The report bore the title of The Citizen and his 
Council.
'  As amended by the Local Government Acts 1978,1985 apd 1988, the Local
Government Administration (Matters Subject to Investigation) Order 1988, and the Local 
Government and Housing Act 1989.
^  I.e. reports which are issued when the local ombudsman thinks that local authorities 
have failed to respond adequately to initial reports. Further Reports are discussed at p.42.
^  See, more particularly, chapters 3 ,4  and 5.
The original report is discussed at p. 122, below, where an outline of the facts 
appears.
See, pp. 57 below.
But the local ombudsman does have jurisdiction to investigate complaints against 
Appeals Committees established under the Education Act 1980. (Originally, those relating 
to grant maintained schools were excluded.)
^  [1989] 1 AUER 1033.
The nature of, and the distinction between, judicial and quasi-judicial decisions wore
evplained in the Report of the Donouglunore Committee on M inisters' Powers (1932) thus:
"A true judieial decision pre supposes an existing dispute between two or more 
parties, and then involves four requisites: (1) the presentation (not necessarily 
oraUy) of their case by the parties to the cUspute; (2) if the dispute between them is a 
question of feet, the ascertainment of the feet by means of evidence adduced by the
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parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of 
the parties on the evidence; (3) if the dispute between them is a question of law, the 
submission of legal argument by the parties; and (4) a decision which disposes of 
the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law 
of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any 
disputed question of law.
"A quasi judicial decision equally pre supposes an existing dispute between two or 
more parties and involves (1) and (2), but does not necessarily involve (3), and 
never involves (4). The place of (4) is taken by administrative action, the character 
of which is determined by the Minister's [so. or other decision-maker's] free choice."
“  The Guide to the Local Government Ombudsman Service, 1.3-01.
”  HC Deb, Vol 754, c 51.1966
[1979] 2 AU ER 881.
[1988]3WLR113.
«  This statement of judicial opinion clearly mirrors s 34(3) of the 1974 Act itself
which provides:
"It is hereby declared that nothing in this Part of this Act authorizes or requires a 
local commissioner to question the merits of a decision taken without
3S
39
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maladministration by an authority in the exercise of a discretion vested in that 
authority."
However, where the maladministration takes the form of perversity or arbitrariness, the 
ombudsman does, in practice, have power to investigate, oven though this will often involve 
a consideration of the quality of the decision and not merely of the decision-making 
processs. S e e , more particularly, pp.95-98, below.
[1989] 1 AUER 1033.
See n. 3 9, above.
See p. 14, above.
^  See n.39, above.
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CHAPTER 2
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND OMBUDSMANSHIP 
A: INTRODUCTION
This chapter develops the comparison between judicial review and ombudsmanship by 
examining the procedural aspects of each The argument is that there are substantial 
differences in relation to the following matters: the nature of the proceedings (though not, 
generally, in the standard of proof); controlling and paying for the proceedings; the extent 
to which the proc^dings arc held in - and the parties' identities are made - public; and the 
nature of the remedies. On the other hand, relatively little difference will be seen in relation 
to certain other matters^ namely: the status required to commence each type of proceeding; 
the attitudes of the courts and the local ombudsman to complainants who delay in making 
their complaints; the relevance of alternative remedies; and the prescriptive effects of both 
judicial decisions and local ombudsman's reports.
More particularly, the advantages of the local ombudsman over judicial review 
will be shown to include the provision of an avenue of complaint which is both free (as fiir 
as complainants are concerned) and private, although in the comparatively small minority of 
cases in which local authorities refuse to accept local ombudsmen's reports, complainants 
are likely to regard the lack of enforceable remedies as being a shortcoming when 
compared with judicial review.*
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B; THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND THE STANDARD OF PROOF
1. Judicial Review
(a) The Nature of the Proceedings
As is usually the case in English courts, the procedure by way of judicial review is 
essentially adversarial. More particularly, this means that the law will impose a burden of 
proof on one of the parties, and that party will not succeed without producing sufficient 
evidence to displace that burden^ However, in the context of judicial review, the potential 
consequences of the adversarial nature of the procedure are somewhat mitigatod by the 
court's requirement of good faith on the part of both applicants and respondents.
For example, in Æ v. Secreteay o f State fo r the Home Department ex parte 
Mannar^ an applicant for judicial review failed to disclose that representations had been 
made on his behalf to the Minister of State, and that a Member of Parliament had made 
inquiries on his behalf. Nolan J emphasized that it was of the greatest m^ortanoe that all 
the facts were disclosed and the applicant's counsel agreed that the application could not 
continue.
The applicant's obligation of disclosure is counterbalanced by the court's high
expectation of respondents. This may be broken down into two elements, as Lord 
Donaldson MR made plain in R. v. Civil Scrviee Appeal Board ex parte Cunningham f  
where he returned to a theme he had introduced in R. i*. Lancashire County Council ex 
parte Huddleston.^
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"]n[Huddlestori\ 1 expressed the view that we had now reached the position in the 
development of judicial review at which public bodies and the courts should be 
regarded as being in partnership in a common endeavour to maintain the highest 
standards of public administration, including, I would add, the administration of 
justice. It followed from this that if leave to apply for judicial review was granted 
by the court, the court was entitled to expect that the respondent would give the 
court sufficient information to enable it to do justice, and that in some casés this 
would involve giving reasons or fuller reasons for a decision than the complainant 
himself would have bem entitled to. Parker LJ and Sir George Waller did not share 
my unease at the limited disclosure made by the council in that case, but I do not 
understand them to have disagreed with the principle."
The first expectation - to provide sufficient information to enable the cotiit to do 
justice - requires no further comment; but the second, and more particular, expectation that 
reasons will be provided when the case is before the court must be rigorously distinguished 
from the lack of any general requirement that reasons shall be given for decisions/
(b) The Standard of Proof
Whether judicial review proceedings are civil or criminal depends on whether the 
decision-making process which is being challenged arose in a civil or a criminal context, but 
those situations which are likely to be comparable with those which might prompt a 
complaint to the local ombudsman will almost invariably be civil. For the purposes of the
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argument of this thesis, therefore, it can be said that the burden on the applicant is to prove 
his case on the balance of probabilities.^
(c) The Possibility of an Appeal
Appeal in relation to applications for judicial review arising from civil cases lies to the 
Court of Appeal, and in applications arising fi;om criminal cases to the House of Lords/
2. The Local Ombudsman
(a) The Nature of the Proceedings
A person seeking judicial review is an applicant, while one seeking redress through the 
local ombudsman is a complainant. Unlike an applicant for judicial review who is required 
to prove his case, a complainant to the local ombudsman is required only to show that he 
has a complaint worthy of investigation. It is for the local ombudsman to decide whether, 
on the face of it, the complaint does fall into this category. If it does so, he will take upon 
himself the task of collecting and evaluating the evidence.
The minimal extent of the complainant's involvement in initiating the local 
ombudsman procedure was explained in the Bradford case,^ where Lord Denning .MR said:
"If the commissioner looking at the case with all his experience can say 'it looks to 
me as if there was maladmini^ation somewhere along the line and not merely an 
erroneous decision' - then he is entitled to investigate it. It would be putting too
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heavy a burden on the complainant to make him specify the maladministration, since 
he has no knowledge of what took place behind the closed doors of the 
administrator's office ... suffice it that [the complainant] specifies the action of the 
local authority in connection with which he complamc there was maladministration."
The basic provisions governing investigations are contained in s.28(l) and (2):
"(1) Where a local commissioner proposes to conduct an investigation pursuant to a 
complaint, he shall afford to the authority concerned, and to any person who is 
alleged in the complaint to have taken or authorized the action complained of, an 
opportunity to comment on any allegations contained in the complaint.
"(2) Every such investigation shall be conducted in private, but except as aforesaid 
the procedure for conducting an investigation shall be such as the local 
commissioner considers appropriate in the circumstances of the case; and without 
prejudice to the generality of the preceding provision the local commissioner may 
obtain information from such persons and in such manner, and may make such 
inquiries, as he thinks fit, and may determine whether any person may be 
represented (by counsel or solicitor, or otherwise) in the investigation."
One important consequence of the inquisitorial nature of the proceedings is that 
it is the ombudsman himself who is in control throughout. However, this aspect is so
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closely connected with the financial aspects of the applications for judicial review and local 
ombudsman investigations that both will be discussed together under the next headmg.
(b) The Standard of Proof
The outcome of many local ombudsman's investigations turns on conflicts of evidence, 
particularly in relation to what was said, or not said, and whether communications in 
writing were received The local ombudsman resolves such conflicts in the light of the 
evidence and on the balance of probabilities.
(c) The Possibility of an Appeal
There is no appeal against the local ombudsman's findings.
3. Conclusion
The distinction between the adversarial nature of judicial review and the inquisitorial nature 
of the local ombudsman's procedure is fimdamental (with some important aspects of the
distinction being discussed under the next heading).
There is a clear distinction between the jurisdictions of the courts and the local 
ombudsman in respect of the availability of an appeal against the decisions of the former 
but not the latter.
However, in practical terms** the standard of the proof - i.e. the balance of 
probabilities - is the same in both contexts.
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C: CONTROLLING AND PAYING FOR THE PROCEEDINGS
1. Judicial Review
Applications for judicial review involve the payment of court fees and are subject to the 
normal principles of costs, which means that the unsuccessful party is usually ordered to 
pay the legal costs of the successful party. The parties are very largely in control of the 
proceedings, at least in terms of the evidence which they propose to adduce (or not, as the 
ease may be), and the court may compel reluctant witnesses to give evidence and produce 
documents. Witnesses who attend, whether reluctantly or not, are entitled to receive 
payment in respect of matters such as subsistence, loss of earnings, and travelling expenses, 
although in practice evidence is commonly given by affidavit without the need for personal 
attendance.
2. The Local Ombudsman
Section 29(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) and (7) of the 1974 Act confers upon the local ombudsman 
powers of compulsion which are broadly speaking the same as those enjoyed by the courts.
More particularly, subs.(l) provides that
"a local commissioner may require any member or officer of the authority 
concerned, or any other person who in his opinion is able to furnish information or
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produce documents relevant to the investigation, to furnish any such information or 
produce any such documents".
Subsection (2) provides that
"a local commissioner shall have the same powers as the High Court in respect of 
the attMidance and examination of witnesses, and in respect of the production of 
documents".
Subsection (3) provides that
"a local commissioner may ... require any person*  ^to fuinish mformation concermng 
communications between the authority concerned and any government department, 
or to produce any correspondence or other documents forming part of any such 
written communication."*^
The subsection also gives the local commissioner power to pay expenses and 
compensation for loss of time to complainants and anyone else who attends, or provides
information for, an investigation.
Subsection (4) provides that neither legal duties of secrecy nor Crown Privilege*"* 
shah apply to information required under subs.(3), although subs.(7) provides that this does 
not extend to compelling the giving of evidence or the production of documents except 
where such compulsion would be available in civil proceedmgs in the High Court.
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Subcection (6) enables the local ombudsman to obtain and pay for "advice from 
any person who in his opinion is qualified to give it", thus reinforcing the point that it is the 
local ombudsman and not the complainant who is in control of the investigation.
Subsection (8) provides that
"if any person without lawful authority or excuse obstructs a local commissioner in 
the performance of his functions under this Part of this Act, or any officer of the 
Commission assisting in the performance of those functions, or is giûlty of any act 
. or omission in relation to an investigation under this Part of this Act which, if the 
investigation were a proceeding in the High Court, would constitute contempt of 
court, the local commissioner may certify the offence to the High Court."
Subsection (9) gives the High Court power to deal with offences which the local
commissioner has certified under subs.(8).
Although the combined effect of subss.(S) and (9) is to create what might be 
termed, by analogy with the established concept of contempt of court, "contempt of the 
local ombudsman", it is in ^ rtan t to notice that, unlike the court, the local ombudsman has 
no powers of enforcement.*^ This is, of course, no more than a specific illustration of his 
general status of having powers without sanctions.
Subsection (4) provides:
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"The conduct of an investigation under this Part of this Act shall not affect any 
action taken by the authority concerned, or any power or duty of that authority to 
take further action with respect to any matters subject to the investigation. "
Although this provision appears to be no more than an aspect of the principle 
that the local ombudsman is concerned with the decision-making process rather than the 
decision itself the local ombudsman has added a gloss to it by holding that the fact of a 
complaint to the local ombudsman does not justify a delay in making a report to a 
committee if such a report would normally be made.**
The cost of the local ombudsman service is met by top-slicing the Revenue
Support Grant, with complainants incurring no financial liability. The local ombudsman may 
recommend that the local authority should reimburse legal or other costs vriiich a 
complainant has incurred in connection with the complaint, but if the complaint is dismissed 
the complainant is not required to pay the local authority's costs of dealing with the local 
ombudsman's investigation.
(c) Conclusion
Judicial review and ombudsmanship are essentially different in terms of controlling and 
paying for the respective processes. In judicial review the applicant has to present his case, 
supported by relevant and admissible evidence, whereas in ombudsmanship the active 
involvement of the complainant ceases when the complaint has boon made. Furthermore, 
the applicant for judicial review incurs fees and may be responsible for the costs of the
BPhil - Illegality and Maladministration - p.36
îgiplication, whereas the complainant to the local ombudsman incurs no financial liability 
whatever.
D: PUBUCITY AND ANONYMITY
1. Judicial Review
Since open justice is commonly perceived to be an essential foundation of liberal 
democracy, it is not surprising that the court's jurisdiction in judicial review is generally 
administered in public, and that the names of the parties will generally be public 
knowledge The basic nature of the principle of open justice is clear from the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Article 6(1) of 
the Convention recognises the right "to a fair and public hearing" in relation to both civil 
and criminal proceedings, while accepting derogations from the principle of openness
"in the interest of morals, public order or national security ... [and]... where the 
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or 
to the ertent strictly necessary ... in special circumstances where publicity would 
prejudice the interests of justice. " **
2. The Local Ombudsman
By way of contrast with the general practice of public proceedings in court, the local 
ombudsman's usual practice is to preserve, ^  far as public loiowledgc is concemod, the
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anonymity of everyone concerned, apart from the local authority. The only exception to 
this practice arises from the £q>plication of s. 3 2 of the Local Government and Housing Act 
1989, which, by way of amendment to the 1974 Act, requires the local ombudsman to 
name any member of a local authority whose action constituted maladministration and also 
constituted a breach of the National Code o f Local Government Conduct, unless  he is 
satisfied that it would be unjust to do so.
The basic provisions governing publicity for reports are contained in s. 30 of the 
1974 Act, which provides that a report of the result of an investigation (or of a decision not 
to conduct one, as the case may be) must be sent to the complainant, to the member (if any) 
who referred the complaint to the local ombudsman,^ and to the person or body whose 
conduct is alleged to have constituted maladministration. The section also requires that a 
copy of the report shall be available for inspection at thé offices of the local authority; and 
that notice of its availability shall be given in a newspaper circulating in the area. Copies of 
the report must also be made available at reasonable cost. The same principles ^p ly  to 
Further Reports/*
3. Conclusion
The local ombudsman's investigations are conducted, and his reports are written, in such a 
way as to preserve the anonymity of the individuals concerned as fiir as practicable, except 
where there has been a breach of the Code of Conduct, when identifications may be made. 
By way of contrast, applications for judicial review, in common with almost all court 
proceedings are held in public, and may be fully reported.
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E; THE NATURE OF THE REMEDIES
1. Judicial Review
The remedies available by way of judiciW review are certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, 
injunctions and declarations,^ and all except declarations are enforceable^ by way of 
contempt of court/* Additionally, 0.53 r.7 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and s.31(4) 
of the Supreme Court Act 1981 both provide that claims for damages may be joined in with 
an application or judicial review. However, it is important to note that the possibility of 
claiming damages in an application for judicial review is purely procedural. In other words, 
an fgiplicant for judicial review who also has a claim for damages against the respondent, 
may combine both matters within a single set of proceedings, rather than having to institute 
and maintain two separate actions; but the rule and the section do not create any right of 
action for damages where none exists independently of those provisions. The question, 
therefore, is: when, if at all, does a breach of public law give rise to an action in damages? 
The House of Lords provided an authoritative survey of the case law on this topic 'mXcmd 
Others (Minors) v. Bedfordshire Cotmiyf Cotmcil (and Other Cases),^ where a variety of 
claims were made in either negligence or breach of statutory duty.
The House of Lords held that claims for damages against public authorities fell 
into four categories, namely actions for breach of statutory duty simpliciter (i.e. 
irrespective of carelessness); actions based solely on the careless performance of a 
statutory duty in the absence of any other common law right of action; actions based on a 
common law duty of care arising either from the imposition of a statutory duty or from the
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performance of it; and (although this did not arise in any of the mstant cases) misfeasance in 
a public office (i.e. the feilure to exercise, or the exercise of, statutory powers either with 
the intention to injure the plaintiff, or in the knowledge that the conduct is unlawful).
Analysing these categories in more detail, the House said that where the action is 
for breach of statutory duty simpliciter, it is necessary to show not only that there has been 
a breach of duty but also that, as a matter of construction of the statute, the duty was 
imposed for the protection of a limited class of the public, and Parliament intended to 
confer upon members of that class a private law right of action for breach of the duty.
There is no general rule by reference to which it can be decided whether a statute does 
create such a right of action, but if the statute indicates a Parliamentary intention to protect 
a limited class, without the corresponding provision of a means of enforcing that 
protection, there may be a private law right of action, because otherwise there will be no 
means of securing the protection which the statute was intended to confer. However, the 
question is always a matter of the construction of a specific statute, and therefore it does 
not follow that the provision of a specific means of enforcement will necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that no private law right of action can also exist.
Where the action is based solely on the careless performance of a statutory duty 
in the absence of any other common law right of action, it is necessary to show that the 
circumstances are such that the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care at common law, 
as well as the duty imposed by the statute. In determining whether there is a duty of carc at 
common law in relation to cases arising out of policy matters, it is necessary to recall that 
the formulation of policy is within the remit of the decision-maker to whom that function
BPhil - Illegality and Maladministration - p.40
has boon allocated, and therefore unless the formulation of the policy in question is so 
unreasonable that it can be said that the decision maker has exceeded its remit, it follows 
that the subject-matter of the claim is non-justiciable. However, assuming that the 
subject-matter of the complaint is justiciable, it remains necess^y for the plaintiff to 
establish that he was owed a duty of care in accordance with the ordinary principles of 
negligence, namely reasonable foreseeability of damage, proximity of the parties, and that it 
would be feir, just and reasonable to in^xise the duty in question.
If damages are awarded, their payment is, of course, enforceable by judicial
process.
2. The Local Ombudsman
The range of recommendations which the local ombudsman makes in practice is as varied 
as the types of maladininistration and injustice which he identifies, but typical examples 
include malting rceommendationc to the effect that people should be given priority on 
housing waiting lists, or should receive compensation in respect of abortive expenditure, or 
should receive payment in respect of their time and trouble in pursuing the complaint. 
Decisions to recommend financial payments are clearly not in any way dependent on legal 
liability.
In common with all other public sector ombudsmen in England, Wales and 
Scotland,^ the local ombudsman has no power to enforce his recommendations. It 
follows that compliance with local ombudsman's recommendations is a matter of 
conscience on the part of the local authority, which may, of course, be conditioned by
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public opinion. It is worth noticing, therefore; that there are statutory provisions which are 
designed to encourage the operation of both these elements.
In addition to the basic requirements in relation to the publicity to be accorded 
to ordinary reports/’ s 31(2) of the 1974 Act^ provides that a local authority must consider 
a report in which the local ombudsman has found maladministration causing injustice, 
within three months (or such longer period os the local ombudsman may agree), and teU the 
local ombudsman what aotion.it has taken, or proposes to take, in response to the report.
The local ombudsman has always had power to issue Further Reports if he is not 
satisfied with the response to an initial report, but the current version of the statutory 
scheme, including the amendments introduced by the Local Government and Housing Act 
1989, provides that a decision to reject a Further Report must be preceded by consideration 
of a report fi^ om an independent person who was not involved in the maladministration,^ 
and can be taken only by a meeting of the full council (i.e. not by a committee).^* If a local 
authority does decide not to comply with a local ombudsman's recommendation, the 
ombudsman can require it to publicise his finding. According to para. 405 of the Report o f 
the Financial Management and Policy Review o f the Commission fo r Local 
Administration, the cost of such publicity can be of the order of £6,000, which leads to the 
conclusion that
"some authorities would rather publish the required statements than jpay quite small 
amounts of compensation - it appears to be the principle that counts."
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In the event of 6ilure to comply with such a requirement, the local ombudsman can 
publicise the matter himself and the loc^ authority will be responsible for his expenditure.^^ 
These amendments appear to have had a significant effect in reducing the number of 
unsatisfactory responses to Further Reports, as the Table o f Outcomes o f Further Reports 
(Compiled From the Annual Reports fo r 1989-90 to 1995-96) shows.
3. Conclusion
There are significant differences between judicial review and the local ombudsman in terms 
of the remedies which are available. More particularly^ any order of the court apart fi^ om 
a declaration - will be enforceable by way of contempt of court, whereas there is no 
enforcement mechanism associated with the local ombudsman's recommendations for 
redress.
F: THE STATUS REQUIRED TO APPLY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OR TO 
COMPLAIN TO THE LOCAL OMBUDSMAN
1. The Status Required to Apply for Judicial Review
Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and s 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, 
provide that in order to have the standing ^vhich is necessary to apply for judicial review, 
the applicant must have a "sufficient interest" in the subjoît-matter of the application. 
"Sufficient interest" is not specifically defined, but before the reform of 0.53 in 1977 a
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substantial body of case-law had developed in relation to locus standi, with different 
criteria being applied in respect of each of the remedies.
It is not immediately apparent from either 0.53 or s.31 whether the new 
terminology was intended to indicate that there is a single test for identifying locus standi. 
Nevertheless, it can clearly be argued that the use of a single form of words to state the test 
was intended to reflect the introduction of a single test, at least to the extent of abolishing 
the old technicalities under which the requirement of standing had varied according to the 
remedy which was being sought; and in /?. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte 
National Federation o f Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd  ^  (also known as the 
Fleet Street Casuals case, because it involved casual workers on national newspapers 
which were then concentrated in Fleet Street), a majority of the House of Lords (Lords 
Diplock, Scarman and Roskill, joined with some uncertainty by Lord Fraser) indicated that 
this was in fact the position.
The Court of Appeal has emphasized the fundamental nature of the requirement 
of locus standi by saying that it goes to the jurisdiction of the court. It follows therefore 
that the parties cannot singly agree between themselves that locus standi will not be put in 
issue, since this could have the effect of conferring upon the court a jurisdiction which it 
may not properly have.^  ^ In reality, however, the general trend of judicial decision-making 
has been to accord locus standi on a generous basis. For example, in both R  v. Greater 
London Council ex parte Blackburn^ and R  v. Hereford Corporation ex parte 
Harrawerf^ ratepayers were held to have locus standi to challenge decisions of local 
authorities.^'
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Additionally, the courts have continued the trend, which has already been 
illustrated by the cases involving the National Federation of Self-Employed and Small 
Businesses Ltd and the Child Poverty Action Group, of according locus standi to public 
interest bodies and pressure g^oups^ .^ In adopting a relaxed attitude, the courts seem to be 
accepting the reality that, in the words of de Smith, Woolf and Jowell,'”
"it is possible for there to be situations where there are persons who are directly 
affected by administrative action who are for reasons of poverty, ignorance or lack 
of an incentive incapable of bringing proceedings There are other situations where 
if a public interest body or pressure group are not in the position to bring 
proceedings nobody would be in a position to do so, as no individual is affected to a 
^ ^ te r  extent than any. other individual. In such situations an appropriate body or, 
if necessary, an appropriate individual should be regarded by the court as having the 
necessaiy standing."
It is clear that a member of a local authority may apply for judicial review in 
respect of a decision of his own authority .'^ * This may not seem startling but is nevertheless 
worth mentioning in order to pave the way for a contrast with the local ombudsman 
context.
2. The Status Required to Complain to the Local Ombudsman
Turning to the local ombudsman, s.26(l) of the 1974 Act refers to a complaint being
BPhil - Illegality and Maladministration - p.4S
"made by or on behalf of a member of the pubhc who claims to have sustained 
injustice..."
The scope of this provision is clarified by s. 27 which provides:
"(1 ) A complaint under this part of this Act may be made by an individual, or by any 
body of persons whether incorporated or not, not being:
(a) a local authority or other authority or body constituted for purposes of 
the public service or of local government, or for the purposes of carrying on 
under national ownership any industry or undertaking or part of any industry 
or undertaking;
(b) any other authority or body whose members are appointed by Her 
M^esty or any Minister of the Crown or government department, or whose 
revenues consist wholly or mainly of moneys provided by Parliament.
"(2) Where the person by whom a complaint might have been made under the 
preceding provisions of this Part of this Act has died or is for any reason unable to 
act for himself  ^the complaint may be made by his personal representative or by a 
member of his femily or by some body or individual suitable to represent him; but
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except as aforesaid a complaint shall not be entertained under this Part of this Act 
unless made by the person aggrieved himself.""”
The generality of this provision is, however, restricted by s.26(7), which 
excludes complaints that, in the opinion of the local ombudsman, affect all, or most, of the 
inhabitants of the local authority's area
Sections 26 and 27 make no provision as to whether members and officers cm  
be regarded as members of the public for the present purposes. The Guide to the Local 
Government Ombudsman Service deals with the question thus:"”
"Councillors and officers can be members of the public when they are not 
complaining in their official role, e.g. if a councillor is complaining about delay in 
carrying out repairs to his council house he is complaining as a member of the 
public. however, he is eomplaining that he was not allowed to speak in a debate 
or not being given information he requires as a councillor he is not complaining as a 
member ^  the pubhc. It is possible, however, that a member of the pubhc could 
make a similar complaint, i.e. that he had suffered injustice because his counciUor 
had been denied something."
On the other hand, it has been argued,^ that the phrase "person aggrieved" 
should be given its ordinary meaning. The argument is based on an analogy with Cook v. 
Southend Borough C o u n c il,where the Court of Appeal held that a local authority which
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had revoked certain hackney carriage licences was a person aggrieved by, and therefore had 
a right of appeal to the Crown Court against, a decision of a magistrates' court to allow an 
appeal against the revocation.^ If this argument were correct, it would follow, for 
example, that a councillor who does not receive prompt relies to correspondence with 
officers would be able to complain to the local ombudsman. However, it is submitted that 
the argument is plainly wrong.
First, it overlooks one of the most basic principles of statutory interpretation:
"No real help can be gained as to the meaning of a word in statute A by reference to 
its meaning in statutes B, C, or D. All one can derive from the cases are the 
relevant principles of construction to be applied.
Secondly, it is plain that the purpose"” of the local ombudsman legislation is to provide 
remedies agûnst administrative errors of various sorts  ^rather than to provide elected 
politicians with weapons against their own bureaucracy. Judicial authorities drawn from 
the realm of hackney carriage licensing are, therefore, nothing to the point when 
interpreting the statutory provisions governing the local ombudsman.
3. Condusion
Although the status required to apply for judicial review is formulated differently from that 
required to complain to the local ombudsman {sufficient interest rather than person 
aggrieved! in practice the two requirements operate in very similar ways. In particular, the
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courts are increasingly willing to accord locus standi to public interest bodies and pressure 
groups, thus reflecting the statutory provision"” which enables "any body of persons 
whether incorporated or not" to complain to the local ombudsman. However, although a 
member may seek judicial review in respect of a decision of his own authority, there 
£q>pears to be no corresponding right to complain to the local ombudsman.
G: TBVffi LIMITS AND DELAY
1. Judicial Review
The normal maximum time limit within which application for judicial review must be made 
is three months, and in some situations promptness may require even more timeous 
application. However, this brief statement glosses over certain differences of wording 
between 0.53, r.4, and s.31(6) of the 1981 Act.
Order 53, r.4 provides:
"An application for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within 
three months fi^ om the date when grounds for the application first arose unless the 
Court considers that there is good reason for extending the period."
Section 31 (6) provides:
"Where the High Court considers that there has been undue delay the court may 
refuse to grant (a) leave for the making of the application; or (b) any relief sought
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on the apphcation, if it considers that the granting of the rehef sought would be 
likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights o t any 
person, or would be detrimental to good administration. "
The leading case on the relationship between 0.53 and s.31 is Æ v. Dairy 
Produce Quota Tribunal fo r England & Wales ex parte Caswell and Caswell,^ which 
involved challenging the allocation of mille production quotas over a number of years. The 
House of Lords said that the relationship between s.31 and 0.53 is that the former specifies 
particular grounds for refusing to grant cither leave or substantive relief as the case may be, 
without limiting, in the words of r.4(3), "the time within which an application for judicial
review may be made".
Consequently, the grant of an extension of time does not mean that the delay 
ceases to be undue, and docs not therefore prevent the refusal of substantive relief in the 
exercise of the court's discretion under s.31(6), to which the court is bound to give effect 
independently of any rule of court.
Furthermore, although the importance of finality may vary between one contact 
and another, it would be unwise to formulate any precise definition of "detriment to good 
administration", s.31(6) recognizes that the interests of good administration are 
independent of hardship or prcjucfiee to the rights of third parties; and good admimstration 
requires, inter alia, a regular flow of consistent decisions, made and published with 
reasonable dispatch, so that citizens may know where they stand and how they can order 
their affairs.
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. Finally, the harm suffered by the applicant is relevant to the exercise of discretion 
under s.31(6), although in the present case this did not prevail over the detriment to good 
administration which would ensue from re-opening a decision to allocate a finite quota 
among various recipients over a number of years.
2. The Local Ombudsman
Section 26(4) of the 1974 Act generally precludes the investigation of a complaint unless it 
is made to either the local ombudsman or a member of the authority concerned
"wAhin twelve months fi*om the day on which the aggrieved person firrt had notice 
of the matters alleged in the complaint"
but proceeds to give the local ombudsman a discretion to investigate complaints made 
outside the time limit "if he considers it reasonable" to do so.
The case-law has reinforced the discretion available to the local ombudsman. In 
Brcuffiird Lord Denning MR summarized the prevailing judicial view thus:
"The modem approach to time bars whether under statutes or the Hague Rules^  ^or 
such like... [is that th<ty]... are not to be enforced rigidly against a conq)lainant 
where justice requires that t6e time be extended and his complaint heard."
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The Guide to the Local Govcmmont Ombudsman Service states the attitude of 
the commissioners themselves to complaints which are made out-of-time thus:^^
"As general guidelines the following types of matter would make it reasonable for 
discretion to be exercised (whilst not creating a closed list) but the further away 
from the twdve month period the date is when the complainant had notice of the 
matters complained of, the more critical the commissioner will be:
- complainant ill or otherwise unable to act;
- complainant trying to get the matter settled locally;
» complainant tried to contact the commissioner but used the wrong route, 
e.g. via MP;
- complainant, because of his own particular circumstances (e.g. an 
inarticulate person with particular problems at the time) was ignorant of the 
existence of the commissioner;
- complainant had good reasons to suppose that his complaint was about to 
be settled locally."
3. Conclusion
Both the courts and the local ombudsman exhibit a degree of flexibility in the way in which 
they opo'ate the principles of their respective schemes in relation to delay However, a 
problem arises when trying to compare the two regimes in operation. In an application for
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judicial review, the relevance of any delay will be an issue between the parties, and the 
decisions of the courts are made in public wWchever party is successfiil, so that both 
decisions where time has and has not been extended enter the public domain. On the other 
hand, it is in the nature of ombudsmanship that where the time limit is held to operate 
against a complainant there will be no investigation, which means that the only reports 
which are available relate to cases in which delay has been held to be excusable.
H: THE RELEVANCE OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
1. The Rdevance of an Alternative Remedy in Relation to Judicial Review
The availability of an alternative remedy is often said to justify the courts in declining to 
grant judicial review. In Æ v. Peterkin ex parte S o n ^  Lord Widgery CJ explained the 
reasoning thus;
"Where Parliament has provided a form of appeal which is equally convenient in the 
sense that the appellate tribunal can deal with the injustice of which the applicant 
complains, this court should in my judgment as a rule allow the appellate machinery 
to take its course. The prerogative orders form the general residual jurisdiction of 
this court whereby the court supervises the work of inferior tribunals and seeks to 
correct injustice where no other adequate remedy exists, but both authority and 
commonsense seem to me to demand that the court should not allow its jurisdiction
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under the prerogative orders to be Used merely as an alternative form of appeal [sic] 
when other and adequate jurisdiction exists elsewhere. "
In Æ V. Birmingham City Council ex pare Ferrero Ltd,^ ^ Taylor LJ emphasized 
that the nature of the statutory appeal in question was crucial when he said:
"Where there is an alternative remedy, and especially where Parliament has provided 
a statutory appeal procedure, it is only exceptionally that judicial review should be 
granted. It is therefore necessary, where the exception is invoked, to look carefully 
at the suitability of the statutory appeal in the context of the particular case."“
The court will be particularly alert to require the use of a statutory jq)peal where, 
in practice, there will be a substantial delay before an application for judicial review is likely 
to be heard, especially in cases where the delay may prejudice vulnerable people.
' The presumption that the existence of an alternative remedy excludes recourse to 
judicial review becomes irrebuttable in those cases where both the alternative remedy, and 
the right which it enforces, are created simultaneously. The classic case is Barraclough v. 
Brown, ^  where the undertakers who were responsible for a waterway had a statutory 
power to remove any boat which sank, and to sell it. If the proceWs of sale were less than 
the cost of removal, the same statute gave the undertakers a specific power to recover the 
balance in the magistrates' court. In the instant case the undertakers wanted to recover 
£3,000. This sum being very substantially more than those which normally came within the
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jurisdiction of the magistrates, the undertakers brought the action in the High Court. The 
court held that the only remedy was in the magistrates' court, because the power to remove 
and sell the wreck, and the power to recover the cost, were both given by the same Act. It 
followed that undertakers seeking to avail themselves of the power of recovery must do so
in accordance with the Act.
However, the principle in Barraclough v. Brawn is applied strictly, as the 
decision of the House of Lords in Pyx Granite v. Minister o f Housing and Local 
Govemmenf^ shows The company claimed the right to quarry in the Malvern Hills under 
a private Act of Parliament passed in 1924. The statutory scheme of planning control 
introduced by the Town and Country Planning Act 1917 not oply defined those situation 
which would constitute "development" needing planning permission, but also provided 
administrative machinoiy for doubtful eases, whereby local plannmg authorities could issue 
determinations as to whether specific proposals would constitute development. The 
question arose ^  to whether the company required planning permission, or whether they 
could rely on their rights under the 1924 Act rights.
The House of Lords distinguished Barraclough v= Brown on the basis that in the 
instant case the right which the company was sccldng to enforce existed independently of^  
rather than having been conferred by, the Act which provided the specific remedy. It 
followed that the courts could determine the question of whether their proposals 
constituted development, and that the company was not restricted to the machinery 
provided by the 1947 Act.
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There may be other cases where the availabihty of an alternative remedy is not 
conclusive. In Æ v. Hillingdon London Borough Council exporte Royco Homes Ltd, the 
issue was whether the company could challenge a local plannmg authority s decision 
directly in the High Court, or whether it must first pursue an appeal to the Secretary of 
State, fi’om whose decision there would then be a statutory right of appeal on a point of 
law to the High Court. The High Court held that direct access to the courts was 
permissible in cases such as this, notwithstanding the alternative remedy of an appeal to the 
Secretary of State, provided that the ground of challenge was simply an issue of law. In 
other eases, however, such as those where issues of fiict, law and planning pohcy are all 
intertwined, the statutory avenue to the Secretary of State would be more appropriate, 
because this would enable all the issues arising out of the case as a whole to be considered 
together, whereas the court would be restricted to considering the legal isaiec in isolation;
In Æ V. Lambeth London Borough Council ex parte C rookes,Sir Louis 
Blom-Cooper QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, said that a court dealing 
with an application for judicial review should regard the local ombudsman as an alternative 
remedy (and should therefore decline to proceed) where the substance of the complaint 
falls within the definition of maladministration, but not where it amounts to illegality,
proportionality or irrationality/^
One recurrent problem injudicial review is whether defendants wishing to raise 
matters of public law by way of defence to legal proceedings should be allowed to do so, or 
whether their foilure to apply for judicial review in the first place will result in their being 
held to have forfeited their right to complain. The current solution to this problem, which
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involves drawing a distinction between civil and criminal proceedings is clear, if not 
altogether satisfactory.^ As fer as cAfi proceedings are concerned, the leading cases are 
Wandsworth London Borough Council v. Windei^ and Avon County Council v. Buscott.
In Winder a tenant was allowed to resist proceedings for arrears of rent and re possession 
on the basis that the sum claimed related only to an increase which he alleged to be ultra 
vires, with the result that thé sum was not lawfully due at all. In Buscott, on the other 
hand, ^ s i e s  who acknowledged they were trespassing on certain land, were not allowed 
to argue, by way of defence to possession proceedmgs in respect of the land, that the 
decision to bring the proceedings against than contravened the Wcdnesbury principle.^
2. The Relevance of an Alternative Remedy in Relation to the Local Ombudsman
The first point to be made when considering the extent to which the existence of an 
alternative remedy excludes the local ombudsman from intervening is that s. 26(5) of the 
1974 Act prohibits the local ombudsman from entertaining a com plet unless he has 
satisfied himself that the local authority has had "a reasonable opportunity to investigate,
and reply to, the complaint."
Section 26(6) proceeds to set out a number of more detailed exclusions, which
generally preclude investigations in respect of
"(a) any action in respect of which the peraon aggrieved has or had a right of appeal, 
reference or review to or before a tribunal constituted by or under any enactment;
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"(b) any action in respect of which the person aggrieved has or had a right of appeal 
to a Minister, of the Crown; or
"(c) any action in respect of which the person aggrieved has or had a remedy by way 
of proceedings in any court of law.
The generality of these provisions is, however, modified by a proviso to the 
Section which gives the local ombudsman a discretion to
"conduct an investigation notwithstanchng the existence of such a right or remedy if 
satisfied that in the particular circumstances it is not reasonable to expect the person 
aggrieved to resort or to have resorted to it.
According to the Guide to the Local Government Ombudsman Service "the 
ability to defend action brought by the authority is not such a remedy". This view has not 
been tested in the courts, but presumably when deciding whether there is an ability to 
defend an action, it would be necessary to bear in mind the distinction drawn in Avon 
County Council v. Buscott between that case and Wandsworth London Borough Council v. 
Winder.'^
More generally, in August 1976, the Commission formul^ed the following 
guidelines for the exercise of the discretion conferred by the proviso in cases where the 
complainant has or had a right of appeal;
BPhil - Illegality and Maladministration - p.58
" - where the complainant was unaware of his right and the authority failed to advise 
him of it; or
" - wh^e the complainant was prevented by absence, illness or some other 
incapacity from resorting to appeal; and
" - where there is no possibility of bringing an out-of-time appeal. 1(71
Even more generally, in October 1979, the Commission, whilst aooepting that some cases 
will always require individual consideration on their merits, agreed the following 
guidelines;^
"(a) If there is a specific statutory right to appeal to a court against the Council's 
actions, the Commission should not exercise discretion.
"(b) If the action complained of is the failure to fulfil a duty which might be enforced 
by on order for judicial review (sie) in the High Court, the commissioner should 
. normally not expect a complainant to risk incurring high costs to achieve a small 
benefit.
"(c) Failure of an authority to comply with contractual obligations that are within 
jurisdiction, e.g. housing repairs, mortgage matters, would normally be investigated
BPhil - Illegality and Maladministration - p. 59
unless the commissioner is being asked to interpret the law, e.g. where there is a 
legal dispute as to the meaning of a document .
"(d) Property rights and claims of negligence are matters for the courts and . 
therefore the commissioner would not normally investigate negligence claims or 
claims affecting property rights, except where:
(i) it is the way the claim was handled that is complained of^  e.g. delay, 
members not being given full information, etc; and
(ii) the cost for the complainant in seeking a remedy in the courts is 
potentially high compared with the value of the right \s^ch the conqilainant 
seeks to estabUsh or defend; and
(iii) the commissioner is not being asked to give a definitive interpretation of 
a disputed point of law
I
No opportunity has arisen for the court to comment on any of these guidelines, 
but Lord Woolfs Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil 
Justice System in England and Wales, 1996, welcomed the fact that the local ombudsman 
exercises his discretion generously, and recommended that the matter should be put on a 
more formal basis.
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3. Conclusion
The ovidencc indioatca that although both judicial review and the local ombudsman may 
sometimes be regarded as providing remedies of last resort, in practice both provide a 
significant degree of flexibility, with the availability of alternative remedies not being 
necessarily determinative of individual cases. In particular, each may regard the other as an 
alternative remedy for the present purposes. One specific point on which the local 
ombudsman's approach is notably more generous is that he does not treat the possibility of 
defending legal proceedings as an alternative remedy, thus rendering irrelevant the 
distinction which the courts draw between cases such as Wandsworth London.Borough 
Council V. Winder and Avon County Council v. Buscott. ”
The remaining chapters of this thesis will be devoted to the specific question of 
the extent to which, in practice, the grounds for applying for judicial review may overlap 
with those for complaining to the local ombudsman, but meanwhile there remains one 
further section of the present chapter to be considered, namely a comparison between the 
prescriptive effects of judicial review and of local ombudsman's reports.
I: COMPARISON OF THE PRESCRIPTIVE EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND OMBUDSMEN'S REPORTS
i. Judicial Decisions
(a) Generally
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The doctrine of binding precedent as praietised by the EngUsh courts may be stated thus: all 
courts bind all lower courts and some courts also bind themselves/* It is commonly said 
that, under this doctrine, the courts are bound to follow previous decisions In reahty, 
however, it is more usually the principles underlying the decisions which ore treated as 
being binding, rather than the decisions themselves. In many cases, of course, the courts 
v^ill not need to distinguish between the decision and the underlying principle of on oarhcr 
case, but on occasion they may feel that the distinction ought to be made. The case of 
Osborne to R o w le ttis instructive. Lord Jessel MR not only made the distinction, but also 
went on to comment on the extent to which principles themselves are binding:
"Now, I have often said, and I repeat it, that the only thing in a judge's decision 
binding as an authority upon a subsequent judge is the principle upon which the case 
was decided: but it is not sufficient that the case should have boon decided on a 
principle if that principle is not itself a right principle, or one not applicable to the 
case; and it is for a subsequent judge to say whether or not it is a right principle, 
and, i f  not, he may himself lay down the true principle. In that case the prior 
decision ceases to be a binding authority or guide for any subsequent judge." 
(Emphasis added.)
Further recognition of the centrality of judicial principle may be found in the judgment of 
V io h tT i G o ^ \J  \n. Elliott V. C (A Minor)'^
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"In my opinion, although of course the courts of this country are bound by the 
doctrine of precedent, sensibly interpreted, nevertheless it would be irresponsible for 
judges to act as automata, rigidly applying authorities without regard to 
consequences. Where, therefore, it appears at first sight that jmthority compels a 
judge to reach a conclusion which he senses to be unjust or inappropriate, he is, I 
consider, under a positive duty to examine the relevant authorities with scrupulous 
care to ascertain whether he can, within the limits imposed by the doctnne of 
precedent (always sensibly interpreted), legitimately interpret or qualify the 
principle expressed in the authorities to achio\'0  the result which he perceives to be 
just or appropriate in the particular case." (Emphasis added.)
The proposition that English Law generally proceeds in accordance with 
principle (and the constraints attaching to principle) rather than precedent is likely to 
become increasingly widely articulated as Enghsh lawyers become increasingly fiumhor with 
the techniques which the &iropean Court of Justice employs when handling Community 
Law/”
(b) Judicial review
Although the matter is not entirely free from doubt,*® it is probable that the High Court's 
jurisdiction in judicial review is not appellate (because there has boon no prior adjudication 
on the issue of the legality o f the decision-muking process), and must, therefore be 
regarded as being either at first instance** or sui generis*^ The significance of the 
distinction between the appellate and non appellate jurisdictions of the High Court for the
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present purpose is that, strictly speaking, it is only cases falling within the former category 
which can be binding on the High Court in later cases. However, care must be taken not to 
overstate the importance of the distiiiction, since in practice judicial comity will normally 
lead a later court to follow an carher decision, even when not bound to do so, unless it is 
convinced that the earlier decision was wrong.
2. Local Ombudsman Reports
Whether English lawyers regard bindingness as being a quahty of the decisions of the 
courts, or of the principles (appropriately interpreted) underlying those decisions, there can 
be no doubt that the notion of bindingness is deeply ingrained in the English legal 
consciousness. Accordingly, lawyers approaching a body of local ombudsman reports may 
be tempted to ask how far if at all those reports will be treated as binding by the local 
ombudsman in later investigations. In other words, do ombudsman decisions constitute 
anything more than a wilderness of single instances** surrounding the key concepts of 
injustice, maladministration and administrative functions?
The answer to this question contains a number of points. First, as far as the 
courts are concerned - and no doubt they are influenced by their own experience of 
developing the common law on a case by case basis there is a perception that Parhament, 
in leaving the term maladministration undefined,
"deliberately left it to the ombudsman himself to interpret the word as best he could: 
and to do it by building up a body o f case-law on the subject" (Emphasis added.)*’
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If this comment is to be taken as more than the trite observation that 
ombudsman's reports will in fact accumulate, presumably it constitutes ap acknowledgment 
that they will have at least some predictive value, in relation to how the ombudsman may be 
expected to treat individual complaints and how he may regard administrative procedures.** 
The predictive value of local ombudsman reports is also implicit in the structure 
of the Guide to the Local Government Ombudsman Service. One section out of the seven 
which constitute the whole work, consists of Selected Reports, where summarized versions 
of a variety of cases are presented. The Guide states that "the intention is to give a broad 
indication of ombudsmen's views".*  ^ Presumably, therefore, successive editors of this 
work, all with experience as local ombudsmen, have taken the view that this material has at 
least some predictive value. Additional evidence in support of this conclusion may be 
derived from the practice of highhghting individual cases in the local ombudsman s Annual 
Reports. Furthermore, there seems to be a perception on the part of those who are subject 
to an ombudsman's jurisdiction that he will apply the principles which he has previously 
articulated;
"It is possible for a single report to have effects far beyond the geographical 
boundary of the authority concerned, leading to the general improvement in 
administrative standards in local government."**
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3. Conclusion
The evidence supports the argument that the processes of judicial review and 
ombudsmanship both produce statements of principle which have some predictive value. 
More particularly, decision-makers may use them for guidance as to the requirements of 
legality and good administration respectively, while, as the other side of the same coin, 
those who feel aggrieved in specific instances are able to assess their chances of success if 
they decide to pursue a complaint through either route.
However, closer examination reveals some distinctions, arising principally from 
the way in which local ombudsman's reports are written; their non-bindingness, even on the 
local authorities concerned; and their relatively limited circulation (\Wien compared with 
law reports), which makes it significantly less likely in practice that potential challengers, 
and their advisers, will be aware of them.
J: CONCLUSION
Judicial review and ombudsmanship possess a number of similarities. The requirement of 
locus standi, and the qualifying condition of being a "person aggrieved", each operate to 
exclude mere busybodies from interfering. The initiation of each process is subject , to a 
relatively short time-limit, with judicial review being particularly restrictive, but in each case 
there is the possibility of extension if; on balance, the interests of justice or fairness require 
it. Similarly, both processes provide what are essentially remedies of last resort, though 
once again there is scope for the exercise of discretion in order to allow matters to proceed
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even if an alternative remedy is available. In this context, the court tends to be stricter than
the local ombudsman.” -
The final similarity worthy of comment is the predictive value of judicial 
decisions and ombudsman's reports. Although there is no express notion of 
self-bindingness on the part of the local ombudsman, there is no doubt that the formulation 
of principles of good administration is one product of the ombudsman process. To this 
extent, therefore, there is a parallel with the judicial process, where the true basis of the 
doctrine of precedent involves fidehty to principles rather than decisions.
Turning to the differences between judicial review and ombudsmanship, there is 
a clear distinction in the extent to which the parties will be publicly identified. Anonymity is 
the exception injudicial review, but (apart from the local authority Aself) the rule in 
ombudsmanship.
Similarly, at a conceptual level, the processes are also different in terms of the 
enforceability of their remedies. In some instances, however, this difference may be more 
apparent than real, since the judicial remedy of declaration is unenforceable and it is not 
uncommon to find the court making no order at all, and merely leaving the judgment to 
stand on its own as a statement of the relevant legal principle.®®
A further difference arises with regard to the availability of the processes in 
contractual contexts. On the basis that such matters give rise to rights in private law, they 
would be excluded from the scope of judicial review. To some extent the same is true of 
the ombudsman remedy, as Sch. V to the 1974 Act shows. However, in practice it is not 
uncommon for the local ombudsman to deal with complaints from tenants against local
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authorities qua landlords, where there is clearly also the possibility of pursuing private law 
rights.
Having sketched the origins and outlined the scope of both judicial review and 
the local ombudsman, and having undertaken a comparative analysis of the procedural 
aspects of each, it is now appropriate to proceed to a comparison of the grounds on which 
each process is invoked, with the particular aim of considering the extent (if any) to which 
both share common principles of good decision-makmg.
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’ But if only a declaration is issued, or if the court relies simply on the judgment itself
(see, p. 21, n.9, above) there will be no enforcement possibility associated with judicial
review.
 ^ Proof "on the balance of probabilities" means:
"If the evidence is such that the tribunal can say: 'we think it more probable 
than not', the burden is discharged, but if the probabilities are equal it is not. " 
(Denning U  in Miller v. Minister o f Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372.)
 ^ [1984] The Times, March 29.
 ^ [1991] 4 AUER310.
" [1986] 2 AUER941.
® See p. 139, below, for the law relating to the giving of reasons.
 ^ See n.2, above.
- Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 16(1), and Administration of Justice Act 1960, s. 1(2),
respectively.
’ [1979] 2 AU ER 881.
Although sometimes a conflict of evidàice need not be resolved. For example, in a 
complaint against Wirral Metropolitan Borough Council, which is discussed further 
at p. 142, below, a school claimed to have sent letters to a chUd's mother, which she denied 
having received. The local ombudsman had no evidence on which to reject the 
mother's claim that she did not receive any of the letters, but refused to say that the
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fact that she may not have done so was the result of any maladministration by the 
local education authority
" I.e. assuming, as will almost invariably be the case, that a complaint to the local 
ombudsman does not arise out of criminal conduct.
"  Subsection (5) provides that neither the Parliamentary Commissioner, nor the 
Health Service Commissioners, nor their officers shall be liable to compulsion under 
subs.(3).
"  The local ombudsman may also apply to the High Court for a writ of subpoena 
under RSC 0.38, r. \9. Re a Subpoena Issued by the Commissioner fo r Local 
Administration (1996) 8 Admin LR 577.
The doctrine known as Crown Privilege until the decision of the House of Lords in 
R  V. Lewes Justices ex parte Home Secretary [1973] AC 388, is now generally 
known as Public Interest Immunity.
"  The local ombudsman's lack of enforcement powers generally is discussed at
pp.41-42, above.
88/C/0967 against Manchester City Council: see, McLeod, Local 
Government Ombudsman: A Casebook, 1993, p.4.
However, the High Court does have inherent jurisdiction to order otherwise where 
the interests of justice so require: R  v. Westminster City Council ex parte Castelli and 
Another (1995) 7 Admin LR 840.
"  The Convention has not been incorporated into English law, but is relevant when
interpreting EngUsh law - see, e.g., Trawnik v. Lennox [1985] 1 WLR 532.
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The text of the Code is reproduced as Appendix II to this thesis, and its use by the 
local ombudsman is discussed further in chapter 5.
^  If the member who referred the complaint to the local ombudsman is no longer a
member of the local authority, the section requires that the copy should be sent to the 
chairman or mayor of the local authority.
"  See, p.42, above, for Further Reports
^  Certiorari quashes decisions which have already been made; prohibition prohibits
future illegality; mandamus compels the performance of public duties; injunctions are 
orders that something should either be done or not done, as the case may be; and 
declcaations are merely declaratory of the law.
^ Against local authorities at any rate: the topic of enforceability against the Crown is 
outwith the scope of this thesis.
^  However it is not uncommon to find the court making no order at all, and merely
leaving the judgment to stand on its own as a statement of the relevant legal principle. See 
p:21, n.9, above 
“  (1995)7 Admin LR 705.
“  But not Northern Ireland where non-compliance with a report constitutes a cause of 
action in the County Court - see the Commissioner for Complaints Act (Northern 
Ireland)1969.
Note, however, that Lord Woolfs Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord 
Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales, 1996, recommended (at 
p;222) the introduction of enforceability. The Report o f the Financial Management and
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Policy Review o f the Commission fo r Local Administration, August 1996, merely 
recommended that the matter should be given further consideration, noting particularly the 
local ombudsman's concern that enforceability would result in the ombudsman process 
being seen as adversarial rather than investigative, which would be "detrimental to 
complainants." (See, para.401 of the Report.)
“  Section 30 of the 1974 Act: see p.38, above.
^  Inserted by s.28 of the 1989 Act.
^  Section 31 A(4), inserted by s.28 of the 1989 Act.
Section 31A(1), inserted by s.28 of the 1989 Act.
Section 31, subss.(2G) & (2H) of the 1974 Act, inserted by s.28 of the 1989 Act. 
See Appendix n  to this thesis.
”  [1981] 2 AUER93.
R  V. Secretary o f State fo r Social Services ex parte Child Poverty Action Group 
and Others [1989] 1 AU ER 1047.
^  [1976] 1 WLR 550.
[1970] 1 WLR 1424.
There is no reason to doubt that the same principle wiU apply to council tax payers 
See, e.g., R  v. Poole Borough Council ex parte Beebee and Others [1991] COD 
264; R  V. HM . Inspectorate o f Pollution ex parte Greenpeace (No. 2) [1994] COD 56; 
R  V. Secretary o f State fo r Foreign Affairs ex parte World Development Movement 1 ,td 
[1994] 1 WLR 386; and R  v. Secretary o f State fo r the Environment ex parte Friends o f 
the Earth L td  (1995) 7 Admin LR 793.
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Judicial Review o f Administrative Action, 5th ed., 1995, p. 121.
R  V. Newham London Borough Council ex parte Haggerty (1987) 85 LGR 48 is an 
example of such an application. (The court held that a local authority can make 
appointment to committees dependent on members declaring interests which would not 
otherwise need to be declared )
In practice, it is not uncommon for solicitors to act on behalf of complainants. In 
these cases the normal principles of agency {qui fa cit per ahum fa cit per se) mean 
that the complaint remains that of the complainant.
2 .2- 01.
^  See, Samuels, (1992) 156 LG Rev 721.
(1990) 154 JP 145.
^  The relevant scheme of licensing is contained in the Local Government
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976.
Quillotex & Co Ltd  v. M inister o f Housing & Local Government [1965] 2 All ER
913.
^  For the dominance of the purposive approach to statutory interpretation, see, e.g..
Lord Diplock in Carter v. Bradbeer [1975] 3 All ER 158;
"If one looks back to the actual decisions of this House ... over the last thirty years 
one cannot feil to be struck by the evidence of a trend away from the purely literal 
towards the purposive construction of statutory provisions."
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^  Section 27(1 ) of the 1974 Act (quoted fully at p.46, above).
“  [1990] 2 AUER434.
[1979] 2 AUER881.
The Hague Rules deal with the carriage of goods by sea.
”  2.1-07
[1972] ImmAR 253.
”  (1991) 155 JP 645.
^  On the fricts, the Court of Appeal held that the statutory appeal procedure was 
geared exactly to deciding the issue in question, which was whether or not a plastic 
toy contained in a chocolate egg constituted a danger to chUdren.
R  V. Humberside County Council ex parte Bogdal (1993) 5 Admin LR 405, wdiere 
the substantive issue was the suitabiUty of the applicant to be registered under the 
Registered Homes Act 1984.
”  (1897)62 JP 275.
[1959] 3 AUER 1.
[1974] 2 AUER643.
[1996] COD 398.
“  Taken in its entirety, this comment is odd since proportionaUty as such does not 
constitute a ground for judicial review (see, e.g.. Lord Lowry's speech in Æ v. Secretary o f 
State fo r the Home Department ex parte Brind [1991] 1 AU ER 720), but its gist is 
consistent with Lord Diplock's statement in Energy Conversion Devices Incorporated's 
Application [1982] FSR 544:
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"Your Lordships should, however, in my view take this opportunity of stating once 
again the important constitutional principle that questions of construction of all 
legislation, primary or secondary, are questions of law to be determined 
authoritatively by courts o f law, that errors in consfruing primary or second^  
legislation made by inferior tribunals that are not courts of law, however specialized 
and prestigious they may be, are subject to correction by judicial review..."
63 For criticism  ^see McLeod, Challenging the Validity o f Byelaws by Way o f Defence 
to/Vojecttfto/i [1994] Crim LR 35.
[1984] 3 AUER976.
"  [1988] 1 AUER 841.
^  The Wednesbury principle is considered in ch. 3.
^  This may appear to create a logical difficulty when read in conjunction with Æ v. 
Lambeth London Brough Council ex parte Crookes (see p. 56, above) because an 
applicant/complainant could be shunted back and forth between the court and the local 
ombudsman, with no possibUity of obtaining a remedy from either. In reaUty, however, the 
local ombudsman would no doubt regard it as "not reasonable" (see the text to the next 
foUowing note) to expect a complainant to pursue an appUcation for judicial review which 
the court has rejected on the basis that complaint to the local ombudsman constitutes an 
alternative remedy.
^  It is this provision which provides an escape from the logical impasse envisaged in
the previous note.
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2.1-03.
^  See p 57, above, for an explanation of these cases.
2.1-03.
2.1-04.
^ The local ombudsman's view that he should not attempt to usurp the function of the
court is - perhaps not surprisingly - shared by the court itself. See, R. v. Commissioner for 
Local Administration ex parte Croydon London Borough Council, (p. 18, above).
See, p.222 of the Woolf Report.
See, p. 56, above.
^  See, e.g., McLeod, Legal Method, 2nd edn, 1996, Part H
^  (1880) 13 ChD 774.
^ [1983] 2 AU ER 1005.
^  See, e g., McLeod, Legal Method, 2nd edn, 1996, chapter 16.
See, e.g., McLeod, Legal Method, 2nd edn, 1996, at pp. 192-194.
" R,v. Greater Manchester Coroner ex parte Tal [\9%A\'i PiXiEK 2^0.
V. Leeds County Court ex parte Morris and Another [1990] 1 AUER 550.
'3 Poole Borough Council v .B & Q  (Retail) Ltd [1983] 7/me5, January 29.
Although the feet of judicial comity probably originated in professional loyalty 
between judges, it also serves the purposes of increasing predictability (thus saving 
costs on the part of prospective litigants and reducing the court s workload), as well, 
as underlining the importance which the court accords to legal principle, even when 
it is free from the fetters of binding precedent.
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** The phrase is Tennyson's: see, Aylmer's Field.
Lord Denning MR, in the Bradford case, when referring to the Crossman 
catalogue. However, the courts have not attempted any further elucidation of the concept. 
“  However, as Gregory and Hutchesson commented, in the early days of the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration:
"Although a rudimentary 'jurisprudence' of sorts is beginning to emerge from the 
work of the Commissioner, his frn#tgs as regards jurisdiction, nmladministration, 
injustice and remedy can scarcely be said to constitute anything like a systematic 
body of ascertainable public law." {The Parliamentary Ombudsman, 1975, pp. 
664-5.)
87
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6-01.
. Logie and Watchman, The Local Ombudsman, 1990, p.252. (This book is a study 
of the Scottish Local Ombudsman, but the principle is plainly of general application,)
The extent to which the local ombudsman applies the altemativo remedy principle 
where the alternative remedy is judicial review, is of course, a major aspect of this thesis - 
see, chapters 3 ,4  and 5, below.
See, p.21, n.9, above.
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CHAPTERS
RELEVANCE AND REASONABLENESS m  DECISION-MAKING 
A: INTRODUCTION
This chapter begins with a statement of the most basic grounds for applying for judicial 
review. It proceeds to analyse some recurrent problems which give rise to applications for 
judicial review and shows that very similar issues also arise in the context of local 
ombudsman's investigations. The evidence suggests that the local ombudsman liberally 
exercises his discretion to investigate complaints even where there is an altem^ve remedy 
by way of judicial review.^
B: THE WEDNESBURY PRESCIFIÆ  AND ITS GCHQ RE-FORMULATION 
Although the grounds for judicial intervention arc always subject to further development by 
the courts, one of the leading statements of the basic principles comes from the judgment 
of Lord Greene MR in Associated Provincial Picture Houses L td v. Wednesbury 
Corporation^ The facts of the case raised the question of whether a local aufriority was 
entitled to have reg^d to the moral welfare of children when exercising its statutory 
discretion to license Sunday entertainments. Approaching the heart of the matter, the 
Master of the Rolls began by explaining the concept which is now commonly referred to as 
"IfgdkgfWy relevance
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"When discretion of this kind is granted, the law recognises certain principles upon 
which that discretion must be exercised, but within the four comers of those 
principles the discretion, in my opinion, is an absolute one, and cannot be 
questioned in any court of law. What then are those principles? They are well 
understood. They are principles which the court looks to in considering any 
question of discretion of this kind. The exercise o f such a discretion must be a real 
exercise o f the discretion . If, in the statute conferring the discretion, there is found 
to be, expressly or by implication, matters which the authority exercising the 
discretion ought to have regard to, then in exercising the discretion it must have 
regard to those matters Conversely, if the nature of the subject matter and the 
general interpretation of the Act make it clear that certain matters would not be 
germane to the matter in question, the authority must disregard those irrelevant 
collateral matters." (Emphasis added.)
He went on to acknowledge that although decision-makers who breach the 
principle of relevance cannot be said to be acting reasonably, there was also another sense 
in which reasonableness could be understood, and, not surprisingly, this has come to be 
known as "Wednesbury reasonableness";
"... the discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? 
Lawyers femiliar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to statutory 
discretions often use the word unreasonable' in a rather comprehensive sense. It
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has frequently been used, and is frequently used, as a general description of the 
things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion 
must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to 
the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration 
matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those 
rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting unreasonably. Similarly, 
there may he something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it 
lay within the powers o f the authority. " (Emphasis added.
The two concepts of Wednesbury relevance and Wednesbury reasonableness, 
when taken in conjunction with Lord Greene’s insistence that "the exercise of such a 
discretion must be a real exercise of the discretion" can be used as the basis of practically 
all applications for judicial review, although it is conventional to give discrete treatment to 
certain sub-topics, such as fettering discretion by contract, estoppel and legitimate 
expectation, and the requirements of natural justice * However, for no apparently good 
reason, in the GCHQ case,’ Lord Diplock introduced a new scheme of classification:
"One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon which 
administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I 
would call illegality, the second irrationality, and the third procedural impropriet)t 
... By illegality ... I mean that the decision-maker must understand correctly the 
law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to i t ... By
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irrationality I mean what can now be succinctly referred to as Wednesbury 
unreasonableness... I have described the third head as procedural impropriety 
rather than as failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with 
procedural fairness towards the person \^dio will be affected by the decision. This is 
because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by an 
administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in 
the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even though such 
failure does not involve any denial of natural justice."^
It seems there is nothing to be gained, and something to be lost, by 
re-formulating the grounds for judicial review in this way. In the first place, it is odd to 
classify one head of judicial review as "illegality", when it is fundamental to the whole 
jurisdiction in judicial review, on whatever ground it is invoked, that there must be illegality 
before the court can intervene. Secondly, nothing is gained by simply re-labelling 
Wednesbury unreasonableness as irrationality, Thirdly, the newly coined principle of 
procédural impropriety merely provides a single label for those situations in which 
procedural requirements must be complied with, whether the specific requirenients in 
question are created by common law on the one hand or by statute or delegated legislation 
on the other.
However, leaving aside the question of its validity, there is no doubt that the 
consequence of the re-classification has been the creation of a dual standard of
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terminology, with only some judges adopting the new scheme whole-heartedly /  This must 
be borne in mind when reading the case-law.
C: THE PRINCIPLE OF RELEVANCE IN OPERATION
1. Generally
(a) Judicial Review
First, as Lord Greene MR acknowledged in the Wednesbury case itself, the statute which 
confers a discretion may expressly provide that some factors are either relevant or 
irrelevant. Many statutes specify matters which are relevant to the exercise of specific 
discretions. For example, s. 70(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 provides 
that when determining an application for planning permission, a local planning authority
"shall have regard to the provisions of the development plan, so fer as material to 
the application, and to any other material considerations."
Less common are statutes excluding specified matters fi*om consideration, but a 
notable example from the realm of local government law may be found in ss. 17 et seq. of 
the Local Government Act 1988, which prohibit local authorities' from taking 
non-commercial matters into account when making decisions relating to contracts for the
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supply of goods, materials or services, or for the execution of works. The Act defines 
"non-commercial matters" at some length, to include matters such as the rates of pay 
which a contractor pays his workforce, and the sexual and ethnic composition of that 
workforce; any involvement of a contractor in irrelevant fields of Government policy (for 
example, defence contracts); the involvement of a contractor in industrial disputes; the 
country of origin of supplies to, or the location in any country of, business interests of a 
contractor; and the political, industrial or sectarian affiliations or interests of a contractor, 
or his directors, partners or employees (the key terms in this provision being defined in 
such a way that, for example, fi’eemasonry is plainly included). Section 18 of the Act 
specifically provides that, broadly speaking, the prohibition on having regard to 
non-commercial considerations shall override the general statutory duty of local authorities 
to make appropriate arrangements for securing that their fimctions are earned out with due 
regard to the need to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination and to promote equality of 
opportunity and good race relations/
Secondly, and more usefully in general terms, there is the P a ^c ld  principle,^ ® 
whieh states that the purpose of the statute which confers the discretion will always be 
relevant. One of the neatest illustrations of this principle in practice is found in the case of 
Pilling V. Abergele Urban District C o u n c ilwhere the local authority had power, under 
the Public Health Act 1936, to license sites for moveable dwellings. It refused one 
application, on the ground that the site would be harmful to amenity. The court held that 
this was unlawful, on the basis that only public health matters were relevant to the exercise
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of powers under the Public Health Act; Amenity matters were within the purview of 
planning law, but were irrelevant in the present context.
(b) The Local Ombudsman
The local ombudsman's reports show that he shares the courts' view that it is important to 
have regard to the right consider^ions, and, more particularly that he regards failure to do 
so as being capable of constituting maladministration. For example, a complaint against 
Southwark London Borough Council arose from a situation in which a local authority 
tenant had withdrawn an application to exercise his "right to buy", but believed that he had 
subsequently withdrawn his withdrawal, thus re-instating his original application. The local 
authority, on the other hand, treated the initial withdrawal as continuing to be effective. By 
the time this confusion had been resolved and the tenant had made à second application, the 
price he would have had to pay had increased by £6,500. The local ombudsman 
recommended that the applicant should be allowed to proceed at the original price. The 
local authority rejected this recommendation for a variety of reasons, one of which was that 
there were known to be several similar cases in which tenants had changed their minds 
about withdrawing their applications, and the establishment of a precedent in this case 
would, therefore, have wider financial implications. Indicating that this was an irrelevant 
consideration, the local ombudsman, in a Further Report," quoted his ovm Annual Report 
fo r 1987-88.
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"To refuse to remedy one specific injustice on the grounds that it might encourage 
others who have also been badly treated to complain, and to be entitled to a 
remedy, is nothing less than a determination to perpetuate injustice".
In addition to the local ombudsman's explicit point, this case can also be read as 
an example of maladministration flowing fi^ om the local authority’s excessive willingness to 
rely on policy, at the expense of evaluating the circumstances of the case on an individual 
basis. It is îq>propriate at this stage, therefore, to consider the extent to whieh policies may 
be relevant considerations.
(c) Conclusion
It is clear, therefore, that the principle of relevance applies in both judicial review and 
ombudsmanship, thus providing further support for the argument of this thesis that, in 
practice, there is a substantial overlap between the activities of the court and the local 
ombudsman.
2. The Relevance of Policy
(a) Judicial Review
The feet that public sector decision-makers formulate and apply their own policies may be 
thought to be too obvious to require either explanation or justification, but in the present 
context it does raise a very specific problem: at what stage, if at all, does decision-making
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in the light of a policy amount to a breach of Lord Greene's requirement*^ that "the exercise 
of a discretion must be a real exercise of the discretion"? (Emphasis added.)
The classic case is R  v. Port o f London Authority ex parte Kynooh)^ where 
BankesU said;
"There are on the one hand cases where a tribunal [5C. a decision-maker] in the 
honest exercise of its discretion has adopted a policy, and, without refusing to hear 
the applicant, intimates to him what its policy is, and that after hearing him it will in 
accordance with its pohcy decide against him^  \inlesG there is something exceptional 
in his case If the policy has been adopted for reasons which the tribunal may
legitimately entertain, no objection could be taken to such a course. On the other 
hand there are cases where a tribunal has passed a rule, or come to a determination, 
not to hear any application of a particular character by whomsoever made. There is 
a wide distinction to be drawn between these two cases.
Quite apart from applying their own policies, public sector decision makers may 
also lawfully take into account policies formulated by other people. Typically, these 
policies will emanate from Secretmies of State and will be contained in departmental 
circulars Such policies are clearly relevant considerations, as Purchas U  made clear in the 
planning law case of Carpets o f Worth Ltd v. Wyre Forest District Council. *’
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"Although the local authority is not bound by ... policy circulars, it should observe 
them and depart from them only if there are clear reasons, which should be stated, 
for so doing."
(b) The Local Ombudsman
The local ombudsman's reports indicate that he shares not only the court's acceptance that 
local authorities are entitled to have policies, but also the corresponding insistence that the 
adoption of a policy does not justify a fiiilure to exercise real discretion in individual cases. 
In a report on an investigation into a complaint against Camden London Borough 
Council)* the local ombudsman said that a local authority was entitled to have a policy of 
allowing travellers to camp on vacant land which it owned, but wont on to say that this 
policy did not justify either a failure to follow normal planning procedures, or the toleration 
of nuisances caused by the travellers.
Similarly, in a report on an investigation into a complaint against Wandsworth 
London Borough Council)^ the local ombudsman accepted that the local authority was 
entitled to adopt a policy of using bailiffs at an early stage wdien pursuing rent arrears, but 
also emphasized that there was a duty to exercise particular care vdien that policy
to vulnerable people, such as the mentally ill.
The local ombudsman's reports also show that he shares the courts' view that 
central government policy is a material eoneidôfation in the decision malong process.
Thus, following an investigation into a complaint against South Norfolk District Council, 
the local ombudsman found maladministration had occurred vdiere the local authority
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granted planning permission for certain residential premises to be used as a nursing home, 
subject to a condition that the benefit of the permission should be restrict^ to the 
^plicants/* Although there is no legal objection in principle to planning permission being 
granted on the basis that its benefit shall be personal to the applicant, the feet that the land 
use planning process is concerned with the impact of land uses on other people means that 
in practice such permissions will be strictly exceptional. In this instance, the local 
ombudsman found that the local authority had fiiiled to have proper regard to the guidance. 
contained in the Secretary of State for the Environment's Circular 1/85, which required the 
use of personal planning permissions to be justified on" strong compassionate or other 
personal grounds".
The importance which the local ombudsman attaches to central government 
advice can be gauged fi'om two reports into investigations on complaints against GUmford 
Borough Council,^  and Avon County C ouncil^ In the Glanford report, which concerned 
the local authority’s feilure to grant a football club relief fi-om rates in respect of its ground, 
the local ombudsman emphasized that where officers make a recommendation to members, 
and ffiose recommendations are at variance with central government advice, the officers 
should ensure that the members are fully apprised of the situation. In the Avon report, 
which involved the administration of appeals against decisions allocating children to 
schools, the local ombudsman said that it was maladministration for a local authority to fail 
to review its own policy in the light of guidance contained in a Départaient of Education 
Circular.
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As the report on an investigation into a complaint against Camden London 
Borough Council ^  shews, questions of prioritising the allocation of scarce resources may 
also impact on questions of policy. However, it is bettor for the purposes of clarity of 
exposition to treat the topic of resource constraints discretely.
(c) Conclusion
Both judicial review and ombudsmanship acknowledge the status of policies as relevant 
considerations, provided they are operated with, sufficient flexibility to prevent them from . 
becoming determinative of all cases to which they £q)ply. Once again, therefore, the 
evidence supports the argument of this thesis that there is, in practice, a very substantial 
overlap between the activities of the court and the local ombudsman.
3. The Relevance of Resource Constraints
(a) Judicial Review
From the courts' point of view, the problems caused by resource constraints raise 
fundamental constitutional issues of accountability, based on the doctrine of the separation 
of powers. More particularly, and bearing in mind the democratic accountability of local 
authorities, it is not surprising that the court will be reluctant to intervene in policy 
decisions." One of the leading examples is Anns v. London Borough o f M erton)^ 
conccrmng the way in which a local authority should have concentrated the activities of its
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building inspectors when they were unable to subject all building work to full inspection. 
Lord Wilberforce said not only that it was for
"public authorities to strike a balance between the claims of efficiency and thrift"
but also that
"whether they get the balance right can only be decided through the ballot box, not 
in the courts.""
However, it is easy to overstate the proposition that resource constraints, 
coupled with the perceived effectiveness of the democratic process as an agency of control, 
may lead the courts to treat resource issues as being non-justiciable. The courts can be 
expected always to be conscious of their constitutional role in upholding the rule of law.
The key distinction in this context seems to be between those cases where resource 
constraints make it genuinely impossible to comply with the law, and those vdiere they 
make it merely difficult to do so.
First, the courts can be expected to be very sceptical of any argument which 
suggests that apparent illegality should be accepted on the grounds that it would have been 
impossible for the decision-maker to have adopted any other course of action. However, 
it is not completely unknown for such an argument to succeed, especially where the 
resource in question is the capacity of an individual to perform all those functions which the
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law allocates, to him. In Carltona Ltd. M Commissioners o f Works)* the company owned a 
factory which was requisitioned by the Commissioners of Works. The order requisitioning 
the factory was challenge  on a number of grounds, but Lord Greene MR accepted that the 
Assistant Secretary who was in charge of the matter was the proper decision-maker;
"In the administration of government... the functions which are given to Ministers 
. .. are . . . so multifarious that no Minister could ever personally attend to them 
[sol the powers given to Ministers are normally exercised . . . by responsible 
officials ... Public business could not be carried on i f  that were not the case." 
(Emphasis added.)
Even this argument may not, however, always find favour with the court. In K  
V. Gateshead Justices ex parte Tesco Stores Ltd,^ s. 1 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952 
provided that when an information was laid, either a justice of the peace or a justices' clerk 
could issue a summons. At the time of this case there was a widespread practice of 
delegating to members of justices' clerks' staff the decision as to whether or not to issue 
summonses. The essence of this decision, which in reality is almost entirely routine, 
involves deciding whether or not the facts alleged in the information disclose an offence. 
Donaldson LJ, rejecting the argument that the workload was such that delegation was 
necessary in purely practical terms, and therefore must be token to have been impliedly 
authorized, said:
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"The short answer to this is that if the practice is unlawful, expedience will not make 
’\X\dLy;iM.Fiatjustitia,ruatcoelum."
On the other hand, a decision maker is more likely to be succesnfiil if he seeks to persuade 
the court that he is doing his best under adverse conditions, and that accordingly his 
conduct should not be stigmatised as unlawful. Two cases involving allegations that the 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner had abdicated his duty to enforce the law are 
instructive.’®
R. V. Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex parte Blackburr)' arose from the 
Commissioner's policy of not prosecuting in gaming cases unless there was evidence either 
of cheating, or that a particular club had become a haunt of criminals. The Commissioner 
based his policy on the argument that he could not justify allocating scarce resources to the 
necessary surveillance and consequent prosecution processes when the interpretation of 
gaming law was so uneertom that there was insufficient liltelihood that convictions would 
result. The Court of Appeal made it plain that, in principle, the court could compel the 
Commissioner to perform his duty of enforcing the law, although in this case no such order 
was ^propriété because the Commissioner hW revised his policy, saying that he would 
start enforcing the law on the basis of a definitive interpretation given by the House of 
Lords’  ^some six weeks before the Court of Appeal hearing in the present case.
In Æ V. Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex parte Blackburn (No. 2),^ the 
essence of the complaint was that the Commissioner was failing to enforce the law against 
"hard" pornography in Soho, preferring to direct his force's energy against "soft"
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pomogrq)hy elsewhere. The Court of Appeal re-stated the basic proposition that, in an 
appropriate case* the court could order the Commissioner to perform his duty of enforcing 
the law. However, once again, on the facts, the court refrained from making such an order, 
on the basis that the Commissioner was doing his best with the limited resources at his 
disposal, and had recently increased the number of officers allocated to obscene 
publications duties.
It seems that the position may be different where the duty is statutory. In Æ v. 
Gloucestershire County Council expense BanŸ* the Court of Appeal held, by a m^ority 
that lack of resources did not excuse a local authority's failure to perform its duty of 
meeting needs in accordance with s. 2 of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 
1970, although if needs could be met in more than one way it would be legitimate to have 
regard to resource constraints when deciding which one to adopt.^^
(b) The Local Ombudsman
The local ombudsman's attitude to the practicalities of constrained resources parallels the 
attitude of the courts. Briefly, his attitude is that matters which can properly bo attributed 
to lack of resources cannot bo characteriscd«as maladministration, but he will be slow to 
conclude that any particular case falls within this category. This point is illustrated in the 
following series of reports.
In a report on an investigation into a complaint against Wakefield Metropolitan 
District Council ^  the local ombudsman acecpted that the legal duty of a local authority to
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give first consideration to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in its 
care cannot be seen in isolation fi*om the fact that the local authority has finite resources.
The report on an investigation into a complaint against Hackney London 
Borough Council provides an example of a situation in which the true cause of injustice 
to the complainant was lack of resources, rather than maladministration. The local 
authority had fiiiled to provide security measures at a community hall on one of the 
council's housing estates. The hall had been subject to repeated brealc ins and at one stage 
the glass in the part of the building which was the favoured point of entry had been 
replaced 110 times in two years. One of the local authority's building surveyors said that 
he would undertake a survey and draw up a specification for the works, and that he hoped 
the necessary works would go out to tender within a few months. In the event, the 
surveyor did undertake the survey but pressure of work prevented him fi’om preparing the 
specification, and in due course the local authority's overall financial position led to the 
project being abandoned. The local ombudsman rejected the con^laint on the basis that
"it is therefore because of scarce financial resources that the works have not been 
done, rather than any administrative fault by the council".
Similarly, in a report on an investigation into a complaint against Cyngor 
Dosbarth Dwyfor the local ombudsman declined to find maladministration where a failure 
to comply with the statutory obligation'*® to process applications for housing renovation 
yants within six months was due entirely to a lack of money with which to pay any grant
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which may have been due. It is important to note that in this case the lack of resources was 
irremediable, and the situation could not even have been covered by borrowing, because 
the local authority had exhausted its Supplementary Credit Approval/** By way of contrat, 
in a report on an investigation into a complaint against Camden London Borough Councif^ 
the local ombudsman concluded that where the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 
1970 imposed a duty on a local authority to adapt a dwelling for the needs of a disabled 
person, the local authority could not excuse itself on the basis of shortage of resources.^ 
The key point was that the local authority had adopted a policy of leaving such jobs to 
compete for attention within the local repairs budgets, rather than prioritising such work 
across the whole of its area.
The reports show that the local ombudsman does not regard mere pressure of 
work and shortage of staff as justifying inactivity. In a report on an investigation into two 
related complaints against Rotherham Metropolitan Borough C ouncil^ the local 
ombudsman found that failure adequately to monitor noise emanating from premises used 
for clay-pigeon shooting amounted to maladministration, even though the failure arose 
from "chronic" staff shortages and the fact that the shooting took place on Sundays.
Noting that the control of pollution legislation imposed on the council a duty to secure the 
abatement of such nuisances, the local ombudsman went on to observe that the local 
authority had failed to consider employing outside consultants to undertake the nccessoiy 
monitoring, and concluded that this failure was maladminisfration,
Similarly, in a report on an investigation into a complaint against Derbyshire 
County Council^ the local ombudsman concluded that staffing difficulties did not absolve
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a local authority from perfonning its statutory obligations to assert and protect the public's 
rights to use footpaths in its area/®
Finally, the report on an investigation into two related complaints against 
Hackney London Borough Council provides a useful overview of the local ombudsman's 
attitude to cases where the local authority seeks to rely upon the inadequacy of its 
resources to justify something which would otherwise be maladministration. The facts of 
the complaints involved failures to deal properly with matters relating to the maintenance, 
repair and inq>rovement of communal areas on one of the local authority's housing estates. 
The local ombudsman recognised that the local authority was operating under "severe 
financial constraints", but commented that this made it "even more important that 
procedures are in place to ensure that the money available is spent equitably. " Failure to 
do so was said to be maladministration.
(c) Conclusion
Both the courts and the local ombudsman acknowledge the reality of resowce constraints 
and may regard them as being sufficient to excuse matters which would otherwise be either 
ultra vires or maladministration, although both will be slow to allow a decision-maker to 
escape an adverse finding on this basis, and in cases involving statutory duties the courts 
may refuse to do so altogether.®* Once again, therefore, the evidence supports the 
argument of this thesis that, in practice, the courts and the local ombudsman proceed on 
very similar bases.
BPhil - Illegality and Maladministration - p.96
D: THE PiUNCIPLE OF REASONABLENESS ^  OPERATION
1. Judicial Review
Lord Greene MR's version of unreasonableness as
"something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream tMt it lay within the 
powers of the authority"®®
was re-worked by Lord Diplock in GCHQ ^  as something which
"is BO outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no 
sensible person who had applied his mind to the question could have arrived at it.”
Although Wednesbury unreasonableness is extremely difficult to establish os a 
ground of challenge, it does occasionally succeed For example. Backhouse V; Lambeth 
Jjondon Borough Council arose fi*om the requirement of the Housing Finance Act 1972 
that local authoritios should either introduce a scheme of fair rents, or increase rents across 
the board by 50p per week. The local authority, wishing to adopt neither ahemativo in 
substance, identified one of its houses which was not only vacant, but was also in such poor 
condition that it was unlikely ever to be let The local authority then increased the rent of 
that house fi-om £7 per week to £18,000 per week. When this increase was averaged out 
across the whole of the local authority’s housing stock, it could bo argued that ronts had ■
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been increased by 50p per week. The High Court hold this to be totally unreasonable, since 
it was clearly designed simply to circumvent the purpose of the statute, rather than being a 
genuine exercise of the discretion which the statute conferred.^^
2. The Local Ombudsman
The two items in the Crossman catalogiie^  ^which most closely correspond to Wednesbury 
unreasonableness and GCHQ irrationality,*® zse perversity and arbitrariness^ since it would 
be difficult to argue that any reasonable decision-maker could act in a way which was either 
perverse or arbitrary. Perhq)s not surprisingly, there are few situations in which findings of 
maladministration are expressly based on these grounds, but the report of im investigatioii 
into a complaint against Llanelli Borough Council which will shortly be discussed, does 
provide one example of such a finding, while the instances discussed subsequently indicate 
that a finding of maladaministration may be based on something akin to perversity or 
arbitrariness without either of these terms actually being used.
In the Llanelli Borough Council repoTi^  ^the local ombudsman found that 
although the local authority had stated publicly that it was guided by a points scheme whw 
allocating tenancies, in practice, allocations depended largely on the patronage of individual 
councillors. He concluded that this was "arbitrary, inconsistent and unfair" and was 
therefore maladministration.
Turning to the more common situation where the vitiating factor is akin to either 
perversity or arbitrariness, without there being any express finding in either of those terms,
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the reports of. investigation into complaints against GrccwwfcA London Borough Council *® 
and Wakefield Metropolitan District Council, a r e  instructive.
In Greenwich, the local ombudsman found, maladministration where the local 
authority had a policy that applicants for accommodation who were homeless and who had 
not previously been tenants of the local authority, would normally be offered only flats and 
maisonettes, rather than houses. The chair of the Housing Committee told the local 
ombudsman that if houses were not excluded one consequence would be that
"all houses would [be] offered to people the council had accepted as homeless. 
About 20 to 40. houses become vacant each month and the council would have a 
n^jor problem defining a policy to determine which homeless families would be 
offered houses. (Over 40 offers are made each week to families who have been 
aooepted as homeless). In seven years as chair of the committee no member or 
officer or voluntary organization has been able to identify criteria for. allocation of 
houses to the homeless which arc not only fa ir but perceived to be fiir.*^ (Original 
emphasis.)
The constitution of the complainant's household, which included her young 
children and her disabled fiither, meant that she needed four bedroomed accommodation, 
and if it were a flat or maisonette it would need to be either on the ground floor or in a 
low-rise block with a lift. Section 22 of the Housing Act 1985 required local authorities to 
give "reasonable priority" to the homeless, and s. 71 of the Act required that account should
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be taken of the Department of the Environment's Code o f Guidance. The text of the Code 
changed while the complainant was on the waiting list, but even the later - and from her 
point of view less fevourable - version required local authorities to have regard to the 
special needs of individual applicants.
Although the ratio of flats to houses in the local authority's housing stock was 
over 2; 1, the ratio of suitable flats to suitable houses was less than 1:3*' During the time 
the complainant was on the waiting list, 30 suitable houses were let in her area of choice, 
compared with only one suitable flat. She was, therefore, significantly disadvantaged by 
the policy.
The local ombudsman noted that the chair of the Housing Committee felt that 
faimess in relation to the homeless was unattainable, but found this view to be "surprising 
to say the least." He went on to conclude that the local authority's policy did not comply 
with the requirements of the Housing Act and was unfrir because it
"unreasonably restricts the options available to most homeless people as compared 
with existing tenants in housing need. I consider this aspect of the council's housing 
policy is unfair and amounts to maladministration."
In the report on an investigation into a complaint against Wakefield 
Metropolitan District Council,^ ^ something closer to perversity was found to constitute 
maladministration where the local authority's computer system allowed an applicant for
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housing accommodation to be registered as having à preference for both a type of property 
and an area when in fact there was no property of that type in that area.
It is more difficult to assign a specific designation to the maladministration which 
was identified in a report on an investigation into a complaint against Cardiff City 
C o u n c ilalthough the grounds probably fall somewhere within the general category of 
perversity or arbitrariness: The essence of the complaint was that the local authority, 
having let the management of a riding school in one of its parks to its own Direct Services 
Organization as a the result of a compulsory competitive tendering process, then undertook 
very selective enforcement of the byelaws which restricted the parking of motor vehicles 
adjoining the riding school. More particularly, non-enforcement occurred at times when 
events were being held at the riding school.®*
The local authority's attitude was that the terms of the byelaws permitted parking 
in designated areas, and that the area in which the parking restrictions were not enforced 
during events were designated for that purpose. Additionally, the parking in question was 
not only subject to marshalling but was also justified on the ground that the riding school 
had to be run as a financially viable business. The local ombudsman took the view that 
compliance with the terms of the byelaws required there to be some formal procedure for 
designating areas, whereas in practice there was none. He also found it objectionable that 
the local authority should be enforcing the law on a selective basis which favoured its own 
commercial interests.®^
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3. Conclusion
Although they use different terminology, with judicial review referring to Wednesbury 
unreasonableness while the local ombudsman reflect the Crossman catalogue's ideas of 
perversity and arbitrariness (although by no means always using these terms e^liçitly), the 
evidence shows that both jurisdictions are willing to uphold challenges based on claims that 
the decision-making process lacks logical coherence More particularly, therefore, the 
evidence supports the argument of this thesis that there is, in practice, a very substantial 
overlap between the activities of the courts and the local ombudsman.
E; CONCLUSION
The evidence shows that, although the terminology employed by the courts and the local 
ombudsman may vary, as a matter of substance the local ombudsman is willing to . 
investigate many complaints based on allegations which fall comfortably within the 
mainstream grounds of application for judicial review, namely Wednesbury irrelevance (or 
illegality), on the one hand and Wednesbury unreasonableness (or irrationality) on the 
other. Not surprisingly, at least in the Wednesbury unreasonableness (or irrationality) 
cases, the local ombudsman follows the courts into the apparently prohibited area of 
questioning the quality of the decisions, and not merely of the decision making processes. 
Illicit though such questioning may be when regard is had to both the constitutional basis of 
the courts' jurisdiction and the statutory terms on which the local ombudsman exercises his 
jurisdiction, in practice it is inevitable given the nature of the grounds of challenge. In 
other words, the local ombudsman has followed the courts in developing an extended
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jurisdiction, when he could, by sheltering behind the statute, have declined to investigate 
complaints which would inevitably require him to assess the quality of the decision itself.
This chapter has, therefore, furnished fuither evidence to support the argument 
of this thesis that there is a substanrid oyerlap between the principles applied by the courts 
injudicial review and those applied by the local ombudsman.
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* The discretion is conferred by the proviso to s. 26(6) of the 1974 Act . See
pp.57-60, above, for the statutory provision and the ombudsman's statement of his policy in 
relation to its application.
" [1947] 2 AUER680
 ^ The final sentence in this quotation wiU be considered under The Principle o f
Reasonableness in Operation, below.
® See chapters 4 and 5, below.
* [1984] 3 AUER935.
® At one time it was common to refer to fiiihire to comply with procedural
requirements specified by either statute or delegated legislation as being procedural 
ultra vires. This part of Lord Diplock's re classification simply serves to emphasize 
that breach of the requirements of faimess, irrespective of whether the requirement 
in question is statutory or common law in origin, can provide grounds for judicial 
review. (The common law requirements of faimess - or natural justice - are 
discussed in chapter 5, below.)
 ^ For a significant dissent fi-om one aspect of the revised terminology at least, sec 
esp., R  V. Devon County Council ex parte G [1988] 3 AU ER 1002, where Lord 
Donaldson MR said of the term "Wednesbury unreasonable";
"I eschew the synonym of'irrational' because, although it is attractive as being 
shorter than 'Wednesbury unreasonable' and has the imprimatur of Lord Diplock... 
it is widely misunderstood by politicians, both local and national, and even more by
BPhil - Illegality and Maladministration - p. 104
their constitumts, as casting doubt upon the mental capacity of the decision maker, 
a mafrer which in practice is seldom if ever in issue."
* And certain other bodies specified in Sch.n to the Act.
® See, S.71 of the Race Relations Act 1976.
*® See, Padfield v. M inister o f Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] 1 All ER 694.
“ [1950] 1 AUER 76.
88/A/0921.
For the Further Report, see McLeod, Local Government Ombudsman: A 
Casebook, 199^, p.
*® In the Wednesbury case (above).
** (1919)83 JP 41.
*® The decision of the House of Lords in British Oxygen v* M inister o f Technology
[1970] 3 AU ER 165 is often cited alongside ex parte Kynoch, presumably because it 
possesses superior status in terms of the doctrine of binding precedent, as weU as being 
more recent. In temis of content, however, ex parte Kynoch is more valuable because it 
also emphasizes the importance of deciding whether the poUcy is itself lawful.
(1991)62P&CR334.
** 87/A/0638; McLeod, Local Government Ombudsman: A Casebook, 1993, p. 165.
92/A/3559;(1994) 158LGRev785.
87/A/0174; see, (1989) 153 LG Rev 585 for the Further Report.
'* The general principle is that the benefit of planning permission runs with the land.
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92/C/1311;(1994) 158LGRev609,
“  92/B/1340; (1994) 158 LG Rev 930.
^  See p.92, above.
“  This non-interventionist attitude was without prejudice to the.court's willingness to 
hold local authorities liable for negligence in respect of the way in which those inspections 
which did take place were actually undertaken.
“  [1977] 2 AUER492.
SimUarly, in /?. v. Greater London Council ex parte Royal Borough o f Kensington 
and Chelsea [1982] The Times, April 7, McNeiU J commented, when faced with a 
chaUenge to the GLC's budget, that the issue was one "for the political hustings, and not 
for the court".
“  [1943] 2 AUER560.
^  [1981] 1 AUER 1027.
The fact that the Police Authority for the MetropoUtan PoUce (i.e. the Home 
Secretary) is outwith the field of local government is irrelevant for the present purposes, 
since the case deals with the responsibility of the chief officer of police, rather than that of 
the PoUce Authority.
"* [1968] 1 AUER 763.
^  In Crickitt v. Kursaal Casinos Ltd (No.2) [1968] 1 AU ER 139.
** [1973] 1 AUER 324.
^  (1996) 93 LSGaz25.
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The House of Lords has heard an appeal against this decision, but has not yet (17 
March 1997) delivered judgment.
^  90/C/2239; (1994)158 LG Rev 314.
Although, in all the circumstances of the case, the local ombudsman concluded that 
there had been maladministration because the local authority had adopted a policy )^ c h  
had the effect of unduly influencing decisions in individual cases.
87/A/0889; (1988) 152 LG Rev 1013.
93/465; (1995) 159 LG Rev 207.
®® Under s. 116, Local Government and Housing Act 1989.
®* Supplementary Credit Approvals are the mechanism by means of which central
government (acting through the Department of the Environment, or the Welsh Office, os 
the case may be), controls local government borrowing.
91/A/1481;(1994) 158 LG Rev 173.
^  The parallel with /?. v. Gloucestershire County Council exporte Barry (see, p.91,
above) is obvious.
®® 88/C/1571 and 88/C/1821; (1991) 155 LG Rev 75.
®* 92/C/1031; (1995) 159 LG Rev 198.
®® See, s. 130, Highways Act 1980.
90/A/3188 and 91/A/0179; (1995) 159 LG Rev 270
See, Æ V. Gloucestershire County Council ex parte Barry -  p.91, above.
®® In the Wednesbury case itself: see, pp.79-80, above.
*® [1984] 3 AUER935.
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** (1972) 116 Sol Jo 802.
“  For further case-law on Wednesbury unreasonableness, see, e.g., McLeod, Judicial 
Rmew, 1993, pp. 109-119.
Quoted in full at p 16, above.
*® See pp. 94-95, above.
** 90/635; (1993) 157 LG Rev 124.
*® 91/A/2064; (1993) 157 LG Rev 734.
*" 93/C/1286; (1994) 158 LG Rev 806.
' The figures were 23,154 flats to 10,460 houses overall, and 425 suitable flats to
1,555 suitable houses.
*® 93/C/1286; (1994) 158 LG Rev 806.
“  92/106; (1994) 158 LG Rev 630.
®* There were 80 such occasions in 1993.
The situation which arises where a decision-maker has an interest in the 
subject-matter of the decision is dealt with specifically in chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 4 
FETTERING DISCRETION BY CONTRACT,
ESTOPPEL AND LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION
A: INTRODUCTION
As the previous chapter demonstrated, one aspect of the Wednesbury principle requires the 
decision-making processes of local authorities, in common with other public-sector 
decision-makers, to proceed by reference to the right considerations This chapter will 
focus on one particular aspect of this proposition, namely the extent to which a local 
authority will be precluded from making a decision which would be inconsistent with a 
pre-existing obligation arising from either a contract or an estoppel. More particularly, it 
will compare the principles applied by the courts with those applied by the local 
ombudsman.
B: FETTERING DISCRETION BY CONTRACT
1. Judicial Review*
(a) The Leading Cases
The leading case is Ayr Hcarhour Trustees v. Oswaldf where the trustees of the harbour had 
the power to purchase land compulsorily in connection with their statutory frmction of 
maintaining and improving the harbour. Oswald owned a parcel of land adjoining the
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harbour, and the trustees wished to buy some of this land. The problem was that if the land 
which Oswald was to retain were to become landlocked its consequential loss of value 
would significantly increase the compensation which he would receive. Accordingly, in an 
attempt to reduce the price they would have to pay, the trustees offered to agree that they 
would not use the land they were acquiring in such a way as to prevent the retained land 
from having access to the harbour Oswald objected to this, and the House of Lords 
upheld his objection, on the ground that the trustees were under a duty to act for the 
benefit of the public, and in the future the public interest may require the use of the 
acquired land in such a way that Oswald's retained land would become cut off from the 
harbour. Any purported agreement which was incompatible with the future performance of 
this public duty would, therefore, be void.
The importance of the test of iriGompatibility was emphasized in Stourcliffe 
Estates Ltd v. Bournemouth Corporation, * where the corporation bought a piece of land 
from the company and covenanted to use it in performance of its statutory functions to 
provide a pleasure ground and open space There were also detailed covenants restricting 
the kind of building which the corporation could erect. The corporation then wanted to 
build public conveniences on the land, close to the boundary with other land which the 
company retained and which it wished to develop for other purposes. When the company 
objected to the construction of the public conveniences, the corporation argued that the 
restriction was void, by analogy with the Ayr Harbour case.® The Court of Appeal held 
that the Ayr Harbour decision was irrelevant, because in the instant case there was no
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incompatibility between the restriction on the use of the land and the performance of the
statutory functions.
Further support for the proposition that incompatibility is the key concept in 
these cases can be drawn from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Windsor & 
Maidenhecui Borough Council v. Brcauirose Investments Ltd.^  The facts were complicated 
and the law was less than straightforward, turning as it did to some extent upon the 
interpretation of the more obscure aspects of s. 52 of the Town and Country Planning Act 
1971.®
BasicaUy, however, the facts were that the local planning authority entered into 
an agreement with the company relating to a scheme of development which included the 
demolition of some buildings. Before demolition took place, the local planning authority 
used its statutory powers to designate the area as a Conservation Area. One consequence 
of this designation was that demolition required the local planning authority's consent. The 
question therefore arose as to whether the local planmng authority was bound by its prior 
agreement to permit the demolition which was involved in the scheme of redevelopment
covered by the s. 52 agreement.
The court held that the local planning authority could not disable itself from 
using its statutory powers to designate Conservation Areas. The reasoning underlying this 
conclusion was complicated by the s. 52 element, but a distinction was drawn between 
implementation of the local planning authority's basic planning policy, in the form of the 
Development Plan, and the pursuit of other planning objectives. How for this conclusion 
depends on the s. 52 element is not clear from the judgment of the court. Nevertheless,
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irrespective of the s. 52 point, the case can be seen as representing a version of the 
incompatibility argument by distinguishing between mtqor and fundamental matters on the 
one hand, and minor and peripheral matters on the other, with the result that lawful
fe tte r in g  can take place only in relation to the latter category.
The final case which requires consideration when analysing the courts' attitude to 
the problem of public authorities binding themselves by agreement is R  v. Hammersmith & 
Fulham London Borough Council ex parte Beddowes:’ A Conservative-controlled local 
authority owned an estate consisting of several blocks of flats which it wished to see 
renovated and improved, with a view to the flats being sold to owner occupiers. Lacking 
resources to enable it to achieve this objective itself, the local authority agreed to sell one 
of the blocks to a private developer, with the benefit of restrictive covenants. The effect of 
these covenants would be that all new lettings of flats on that pairt of the estate which the 
local authority would retain would be by way of long leases at a premium. In other words, 
no ordinary council tenancies would be created in the future. Viewed in the round, 
therefore, this scheme enabled the local authority to raise the capital to renovate the 
premises which it retained, while the private developer could re sell the flats which he had 
bought, and give his purchasers an assurance that the "quality of the neighbourhood was 
improving. The scheme was, of course, politically highly contentious, and following a 
change in political control of the authority, one the council's tenants on the estate qiplied 
for judicial review to quash the decision to accept the private developer’s offer to buy the
block of flats.
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The Court of Appeal upheld the Hgh Court's decision to dismiss the application. 
Concluding that the local authority's policy was rational and coherent, and therefore could 
not be characterised as Wednesbury unreasonable, the court said that the local authority s 
statutory power to dispose of land held for housing purposes earned with it an implied 
power to enter into covenants restricting the use of land which the local authority retained. 
The retained land was being held for the purpose of providing housing accommodation, and 
the local authority's policy that the accommodation should be made available on the basis of 
owner “Occupation, rather than by way of council tenimcies, was not inconsistent with that 
purpose. Furthermore, the present exercise of discretion was not rendered unlawful merely 
because the local authority, if subsequently constituted differently in party political terms, 
would find certain policy options were no longer available.
At the level of principle, the court indicated that if a statutory power is honestly 
and reasonably exercised in pursuit of a statutory objective, the exercise of that power 
could not be construed as an unlawfiil fetter on another power which existed for the some 
statutory purpose. In a ease such as the instant one, therefore, the local authority could not 
change its mind without being in breach of contract; and this would give rise to an action 
for damages at least, with the possibility of an application for specific performance.
(b) Conclusion
The courts refuse to treat a contract as binding where the effect would be to prevent the 
future performance of a public duty, while being willing to recognize bindingness in cases
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where the future effect will merely flow from the purely practical consideration that what is 
done at one time may necessarily restrict what can be done subsequently.
2. The Local Ombudsman
The effect of s.26 of, and paras.2 and 3 of Sch V to, the Local Government Act 1974 is to 
disqualify the local ombudsman from investigating complaints relating to practically all 
contractual matters,* and therefore it is not surprising that there should be a dearth of 
comparative material dealing with situations comparable with those which arose in the Jiyr 
HarhauF and Bournemouth^^ cases.
There iSi however, material from both jurisdictions arising from the question of 
Wiether the applicant or the complainant should have been allowed to enter into a 
contractual relationship with the local authority, but these situations amount, in essence, to 
claims that legitimate expectations have been frustrated, and therefore they are best 
considered in that context.*’
C: ESTOPPEL
1 Judicial Review
Where the conduct of a public sector decision-maker does not amount to entering into a 
contract, it may nevertheless be possible to argue that it is sufficient to raise an estoppel "  
For the purposes of private law, where the doctrine originates, there are various 
classifications of estoppel, such as common law estoppel, equitable estoppel, issue
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estoppel, and so on. However, for the present purposes it is sufficient to note Craig's point 
that:
"It may be best to regard estoppel as applied to public bodies ss sui generis, it may 
refer to fact or intent, and may be suspensory or extinguish the right, depending 
upon the circumstances. The one constant is that there would be no reason to apply 
the doctrine unless, the representee suffered detriment. " (Emphasis added.)**
At first sight it may seem obvious that where a statement or representation is 
made by, or on behalf of, a public body, in circumstances which would give rise to an 
estoppel if the situation were governed entirely by private law concepts, it will follow that 
an estoppel will arise in the ordinary way. However, if the statement or representation 
relates to something which ultra vires the public body, the. effect of allowing an estoppel 
to operate would be to enable the body to extend its own powers by no more than a mere 
assertion. On the other hand, if the law accepts the legitimacy of this objection to 
recognising an estoppel, the innocent representee suffers.
The basic problem may be illustrated by the Privy Council case of Maritime 
Electric Co v. General Dairies Ltd.'* The electricity company had a statutory duty to 
charge a particular price for its electricity, but nevertheless over a period of two years, it 
actually charged one customer only 10% of the correct price. When the company sued the 
customer for the balance of the price, the customer argued that an estoppel had arisen.
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Refusing to recognise an estoppel, the Privy Council emphasized the statutory duty aspect 
of the case. More particularly. Lord Maugham said;
"Estoppel is only a rule of evidence ... [and]... it cannot therefore avail... to release 
the plaintiff from an obligation to obey such a statute, nor can it enable the 
defendant to escape from a statutory obligation of such a kind on his part."
The leading modem case on estoppel is Western Fish Products Ltd v. Penwith 
District Council'^  which decided, in the light of a substantial body of case-law, that there 
was a distinction to be drawn between those situations (such as that which arose in the 
previous case) where it was held that an estoppel could not prevent the performanee of a 
public duty, and those situations in which it was argued merely that a public body could be 
estopped from insisting on pure formalities. In all the circumstances of the instant case, the 
Court of Appeal held that there was no estoppel anyway (because there had been neither a 
sufficient representation nor any detrimental reliance), but speaking at the level of principle, 
Megaw LJ said:
"If a planning authority waives a procedural requirement relating to any application 
made to it for the exercise of its statutory powers, it may be estopped from relying 
on the lack of formality."
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Although the facts of the case were such that this statement is expressed in terms 
of planning authorities, it is plainly of general application.
Briefly, therefore, the courts have developed an attitude which allows estoppel 
to operate in order to protect the interests of the subject provided the effect is not to 
prevent the performance of a public duty. Where this would be the effect, however, the 
public interest prevails, and no estoppel will operate.
2. The Local Ombudsman
As the next section will show, the courts now tend to apply the concept of legitimate 
expectation to .cases which they would previously have decided on the basis of estoppel. 
Since legitimate expectation is the more modem doctrine, it is perhaps not surprising that 
the local ombudsman's reports tend to reflect an attitude shaped more by that doctrine than 
by the older, more formal and more technical doctrine of estoppel, although it must be said 
that the reports tend not to rely e?q>licitly on either doctrine, being based rather on 
propriety or faimess.
Whatever terminology is used, the relevant local ombudsman reports sit more 
comfortably under the heading of legitimate expectation, and therefore they will be 
considered there.
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D: LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION 
1. Judicial Review
In recent years, cases which would once have been argued and decided in terms of estoppel 
have tended to be seen in terms of legitimate expectation. The links between the two 
doctrines emerge clearly from R. v. Jockey Club ex parte RAM Racecourses where
Stuart-Smith LJ and Simon Brown J both said that in order to succeed on the basis of 
legitimate expectation, an applicant for judicial review would have to establish the 
foUowing matters: that there had been a clear and unambiguous representation; if the 
representation was not made directly to the applicant, that he was within a dass of persons 
^titled to rely on the representation, or that it was reasonable for him to rely on it; that the 
applicant did, in fact, rely on the representation; that the applicant's reliance on the 
representation was to his detriment; and that there was no overriding interest, arising from 
their duties and responsibilities which entitled the decision-maker to change its policy to the
detriment of the applicant.
More recently, however, in R  i'. Secretary o f State fo r the Home Department ex 
parte Jaramillo-Silva, the Court of Appeal has significantly relaxed the doctrine, by 
emphasizing its basis:
"Reliance and detriment are not necessarily required in every legitimate expectation
case. But ... it is certainly necessary for the applicant to establish that it was unfair
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or inconsistent with good administration [to allow the decision-maker to depart 
from a representation which it had made]". (Emphasis added.)
The idea of legitimate expectation generally is well illustrated by 
Taxi Owners' Association^* which is one of the earliest cases in which the doctrine was 
articulated The facts were that the local authority proposed to increase the number of taxi 
cab licences which it issued. The cab owners wanted the number of licences to remain 
static, but the cab drivers wanted the number to be increased to enable them to conqiete 
more effectively with mini-cabs. The corporation told the cab owners that full consultation 
would precede any decision on the question of an increase. Thereafter, the corporation 
again began to think in terms of an increase^ but the chairman of the relevant oommittee 
said that no increase would take place before the corporation had obtained Private Act 
powers to control mini-cabs. When the corporation was advised that the chairman's 
undertaking was not bindmg, the cab owners applied for judicial review to prevent the 
increase from taking place. Having lost in the High Court, they succeeded in the Court of 
Appeal, which held that full consultation was required. The court also held that the 
chairman's undertaking should be honoured, unless - as was not the case hero ■ it conflicted 
with the performance of a statutory duty. The chairman's undertaking had created a 
le^timate expectation on the part of the cab owners that there would be full consultation 
before a decision was made.
More specifically, the proposition that the doctrine of legitimate expectation is 
based on fairness may be illustrated by R, v. .Enfield London Borough Council ex parte T.
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F. Unwin (Roydon) Limited^^ A local authority suspended one of its contractors in 
consequence of a private transaction between the contractor and one of the local authority's 
employees. The High Court held that because the contractor had been on the authority's 
approved list for a long time, and there had been no previous complaints which would , 
justify removal from the list, the contractor had a legitimate expectation of fair treatment 
over and above the specific provisions as to the giving of reasons contained in s. 20 of the
Local Government Act 1988.
Disputes as to whether a genuinely held expectation is also legitimate will be • 
resolved by reference to an objective test. In R  v. Swale Borough Council and Another ex 
parte Royal Society fo r the Protection o fB ird ^  the applicant for judicial review claimed, 
inter alia, to have had a legitimate expectation that it would be consulted during the 
decision-making process on a complex scheme of land reclamation. The difficulty arose 
over a misunderstanding between the parties as to precisely which decision would bo 
preceded by consultation. Having had no difficulty in holding that a promise of 
consultation creates a legitimate expectation, the High Court went on to hold that where 
there is a genuine and reasonable misunderstanding of the kind in question, the court must
adopt the position of the reasonable bystander.
Although the case of/?, v. Lancashire County Council ex parte Telegraph 
Service Stations Ltd^^ was not argued explicitly in terms of legitimate expectation, this 
doctrine was (inq)licitly at least) at the heart of the matter to be decided The fiictc wore 
that a local authority put a piece of land on the market as a result of pressure from X that it 
should do so. It then provisionally accepted an offer from following which it received a
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higher offer from X. A sub-committee resolved to proceed with the sale to Y. Stated 
narrowly- the specific question of law was whether the local authority was obtaining the 
best price reasonably obtainable, as it was required to do under s. 123(2) of the Local 
Government Act 1972. Quashing the sub-committee's decision to proceed with the sale to 
Y, McCowan J said that the local authority should have weighed the ethical and 
commercial factors against each other, rather than regarding the ethical factors, which they 
saw as being all in favour of Y, as being determinative of the issue.
Finally, for the avoidance of doubt, it is worth noting that mere inconsistency 
with an earlier decision will not necessarily justify a challenge based on fiaistration of a 
legitimate expectation. In/?, v. Birmingham City Council ex parte Sheptonhurst Ltd the 
question was whether a local authority could lawfully refuse to renew expiring sex shop 
licences.^ The local authority's apparent difficulty was that there had been no change in the 
circumstances of the areas in which the shops wore situated since the grant of the previous 
licences. The court acknowledged that when considering an application for renewal of a 
sex shop licence, a local authority must have regard to the fact that a licence has previously 
been granted. However, the court also noted that Parliament must be aware that a local 
authority is a body of changing composition and shifting opinion, whose changes and shifts 
reflect the views of the local electorate. It followed that the previous decision in favour of 
the sex shop proprietors could be no more than one consideration to be put into the balance
alongside all other relevant matters.
Briefly, therefore, by placing the emphasis on fairness, the courts have developed
a flexible doctrine of legitimate expectation, without losing coherence. By way of contrast, 
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the next section will show that the local ombudsman's approach is less than totally 
coherent;
3. The Local Ombudsman
To begin with a clesu* example of the local ombudsman adopting a similar approach to that 
of the courts, it is appropriate to consider the report of an investigation into a complaint 
against Bolsover District C ouncil^ The local ombudsman found no maladministration 
where planning permission was granted in respect of a proposal which had previously been 
rejected, because the different results were accounted for by significant changes in the 
composition of the committee between the two decisions. This is, of course, entirely 
consistent with the view of the High Court in ex parte Sheptonhurst L td ^
However, the local ombudsman took a different view in the report of an 
investigation into a complaint against City Council, where he eoncluded that the
local authority was bound by an undertaking which its predecessor had given in 1962. The 
undertaking was to the effect that certain land would remain undeveloped, but in 
subsequent decades it became clear that, despite the undertaking, the local authority 
wanted to see the land developed, and the draft Development Plan reflected this, th e  local 
ombudsman concluded that departure fi-om the undertaking would be
"a gross breach of a solemn promise and should not be imdortalcen. The city must 
pursue whatever means are available to them in the courts and Parliament to remove 
the restraint if that is the city's wish. "
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The proposition that it would be wrong to breach the undertaking was 
underlined by the local ombudsman's view that if such a breach were to occur, the local 
authority should compensate the owners of property which depreciated in value as a result.
In two other reports, however, the local ombudsman has accepted that a local 
authority is entitled to act inconsistently, provided it pays compensation. In the report on 
an investigation into a complaint against Bristol City Council the local ombudsman dealt 
with a situation in which the local authority, being anxious to see certain property 
converted and refurbished in order to provide residential accommodation, agreed to pay a 
developer a sum in excess of £245,000 by way of improvement grant. Following a change 
of political control, the local authority refused to proceed with the grant. The local 
ombudsman concluded that;
"Local authorities are entitled to change their mind for political as well as other 
reasons. However, if they do they must bear the consequences, llie  relationship 
between the developer and the council was one of partnership in fact, even if it did 
not amount to one in law. If was a council-led scheme and the council effectively 
pulled out at the eleventh hour."
In practical terms, this meant that the developer should be compensated for the 
abortive expenditure which it had incurred in connection with the scheme.
The local ombudsman took a similar view in the report of an investigation into a 
complaint against Tower Hamlets London Borough Council^* The facts were that the local
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authority was divided for administrative purposes into smaller units known as 
"neighbourhoods". One neighbourhood had agreed in principle to sell a particular site to a 
doctor, who would then develop it as a surgery/health centre. The terms of the transaction 
had been agreed and both parties had instructed solicitors; By this stage the doctor had 
incurred preliminary expenditure of approximately £15,000. Political control of the 
neighbourhood then changed. The incoming party wished to retain the site for "possible 
future housing community use", and accordingly the doctor was offered another site. On 
the way to concluding that the local authority should compensate the doctor for his 
abortive expenditure in connection with the first site, the local ombudsman cited his own 
Annual Report for 1984r85:
"Councils as political bodies make political decisions; they are entitled to change 
their policies and will often do so, especially when the political control of the 
council alters ... but if any persons have taken action in reasonable reliance on 
previous policies and because of the change have necessarily incurred abortive 
expenses or professional.costs, or have irrevocably changed their circumstances, 
good administration requires either that they should be excluded fi"om the change in 
policy or that they should be compensated for their loss or expense."
In respect of both the Bristol and the Tower Hamlets reports, it is difficult to sec 
how the local authority can sensibly be said to be entitled to change its mind, and yet be 
under an obligation to pay compensation when it does so, since the payment of
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compensation is typically appropriate in respect of harm suffered in consequence of some 
wrong-doing. Furthermore, the view that changes in political control justify local 
authorities in changing decisions which have already been made, reflects a clear divergence 
from the attitude of the court in the contract case of R  v. H ammersmith & Fulham London 
Borough Council ex parte Beddowes^
There is a clear p^allel between the facts giving rise to R  v. Lancashire County 
Council ex parte Telegraph Service Stations Ltd  ^  and those dealt with in the local 
ombudsman's report on an investigation into a complaint against KirkJees Metropolitan 
Borough C o u n cil,where the local authority advertised a piece of land as being available 
for sale. In due course, the relevant sub-committee agreed to sell the land to X, following 
receipt of an officers' report which indicated that X had made an offia* of £11,000, but 
which made no mention of the fact that an agent had clearly indicated that one of his 
clients, Y, was seriously interested in buying the property. When Ys interest matured into 
an offer of £15,000, X was allowed to match it, and the land was sold to him. Upholding 
Ys conq)laint, the local ombudsman attached significance to the fiict that thé 
sub-committee which had initially agreed to sell, the land to X had not known that there was 
other serious interest in the property, because from that point Onwards the local authority 
considered itself morally bound to sell to X. The local ombudsman concluded that the local 
authority should compensate Y for his abortive expenditure.
Despite the clear similarity between this fact-situation mid that which gave rise 
to the Lancashire County Council case,^  ^it is also possible to distinguish them. In the first 
situation, the land was put on the market only as a result of pressure from the aspiring but
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disappointed purchaser, whereas in the second situation not only did the local authority 
.market the land spontaneously, but also it did ultimately receive full value for the land. 
Nevertheless, in both cases the crucial matter was that the local authority was taken to have 
erred in its perception that the moral situation led to the conclusion that all the merit was 
on one side, rather than approaching both parties in a more even-handed manner /^
4. Conclusion
The courts have developed a consistent doctrine of legitimate expectation which will in 
most cases produce the same results as the .now unAshionable doctrine: of estoppel would 
do, although the emphasis on fairness rather than formality, which emerges from the 
decision in R u Secretary o f State fo r the Home Department ox parte Jaramillo-SilvcP^ 
shows a willingness to be flexible in order to meet the court's perception of the needs of 
justice in individual cases.
The local ombudsman takes the same view as the courts in some situations, as 
evidenced by the Bolsover report^  ^and R  v. Birmingham City Council ex parte 
Sheptonhurst Ltd}^ On the other hand, the conclusion in the Leicester report,^^ that the 
local authority should not go back on its predecessor's undertaking when preparing the 
draft Development Plan, is at odds with Windsor & Maidenhead Borough Council v. 
Brandrose Investments Ltd^* which accords primacy to the public interest in seeing that 
plan implemented.^® By way of contrast, the local ombudsman has not yet produced a 
totally consistent view. More particularly, it is difficult to see why a local authority should 
be required to pay compensation in respect of actions which it is entitled to take.
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F: CONCLUSION
This chapter provides further evidence to support the argument of this thesis that there is 
substantial overlap between the activities of the courts in judicial review and those of the 
local ombudsman, ahhou^ it has also disclosed some discrepancies between the two 
approaches
The evidence clearly shows that both the courts and the local ombudsman accept 
the general desirability of consistency in decision-making, while at the same time 
recognising that there are some circumstances in which the retention of flexibility is even 
more desirable More particularly, both accord priority to the retention of flexibility in 
instances such as those which gave rise to the complaint against Bolsover District 
Council,''® and the application for judicial review in respect of Birmingham City Council's 
sex shop licensing decisions,'" where the decision-makers are democratically elected, and 
may, therefore, be said to be subject to a relatively direct form of political accountability.
It is, however, difficult to assess the local ombudsman's attitude fully, since his 
reports sometimes disclose a lack of coi^istency in terms of the most fundamental 
principles of entitlement to do things and liability for loss occasioned by doing them.
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* Many of the leading judicial authorities pre-date the modem use of judicial review 
and are, therefore, contained in other types of proceedings. However, the principles which 
those cases establish are of equal relevance to judicial review.
 ^ (1883) App Cas 623.
" [1910] 2 Ch 12.
 ^ There were also arguments based on the detailed wording of the covenants, but
these are irrelevant for the present purposes.
" [1983] 1 AUER 818.
® Planning agreements were renamed "planning obligations" by the Town and
Country Planning Act 1990, and are now governed by that Act, as amended by the 
Planning and Compensation Act 1991.
 ^ [1987] 1 AUER 369.
* See, p. 15, above.
® See, p. 109, above.
See, p. 110, above.
“ See pp. 118, below.
The doctrine of estoppel states that where one person has made a representation on 
which another, person has reUed to his detriment, the person who made the representation 
cannot go back on it.
"  Administrative Law, 3rd cdn, 1994, p 653, n.3
[1937] 1 AUER 748.
"  [1981] 2 AUER204'.
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(1991)3 Admin LR 265.
.. (1995) 7 Admin LR 445.
"  [1972] 2 AUER589.'
(1989) 153 LG Rev 890.
“  [1990] 1 AUER 1026.
(1989) 153 LG Rev 510.
“  [1990] 1 AUER 1026.
^ The sex shop licensing system is contained in the Local Government (MisceUaneous
Provisions) Act, 1982.
^  91/C/1515.
“  See, p. 121, above.
“  88/B/0070; McLeod, Local Govémment Ombudsman: A Casebook, 1993, p. 148.
The local authoriiÿs' refusal to accept this Report resulted in a Further Report - see, (1991) 
155 LG Rev 176 - which is cited at p. 13, above.
87/B/1007; McLeod, Local Government Ombudsman: A Casebook, 1993, p. 135.
“  91/A/1615; (1993) 157 LG Rev 48.
”  See, p. 112, above.
“  See, p. 120, above.
90/C/1863; (1992) 156 LG Rev 873.
See, p. 120, above.
The topic of disposal of land generaUy is dealt with in the local Ombudsman's 
Guidance on Good Practice No. 5, pubUshed in 1995;
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^  See, p. 118, above.
” See, p. 122, above.
“  See, p. 121, above.
See, p. 122, above.
See, p .I l l ,  above.
It is submitted that the fact that the Windsor & Maidenhead case arose from an 
agreement, while the complaint giving rise to the Leicester report was based on an 
undertaking, does not affect the issue of principle as to a local authority’s freedom to act in 
the public interest.
^  See, p. 122, above
See, p. 121, above.
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CHAPTERS 
NATURAL JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS
A: INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss those grounds for judicial review which are found in the common 
law principles governing the requirement of Aimess in decision-maldng, and then consider 
the local ombudsman's approach to similar situations, including those arising under the 
National Code o f Local Government Conduct. The statutory provisions requiring 
councillors and officers to declare their pecuniary interests' will not be discussed since their 
enforcement is by way of prosecution rather than judicial review,^ and is, therefore, beyond
the scope of this thesis
The court cases and ombudsman's reports discussed in this chapter will present 
fiirther evidence in support of the argument of this thesis that there is substantial overlap in 
practice between the jurisdictions of the courts and the local ombudsman.
B: JUDICIAL REVIEW
1. Fairness in Relation to Judicial Review Generally
Although there is a sense in which the whole concept of judicial review is based on securing 
a degree of procedural fairness, English law has for centuries^ developed a discrete 
doctrine which has traditionally been labelled "natural justice". The doctrine has also been
BPhil - Illegality and Maladministration - p. 131
described" as "fair play in action", and Lord Diplock has even suggested that it should 
simply be l a b e l l e d u n d e r  which giiise it should be regarded as one of the major 
strands of procedural propriety /  However, nothing turns on the labelling;
"It is now clearly settled, as is indeed self-evident, that there is no difference 
between 'natural justice' and acting fairly', but that they are alternative names for a 
single but flexible doctrine whose content may vary according to the nature of the 
power [which the decision-maker is exercising] and the circumstances of the case.
The Act that the existence of the doctrine is well-established does not mean that 
its applicability and content have always been similarly beyond question in every case. As 
TucVexlJ Russell V. Duke o f Norfolk^
"[The requirements of natural justiee] must depend on the circumstances of the 
case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the tribunal [5C. the 
decision-maker] is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth."
Nevertheless, there are undoubtedly two broad headings under which the 
doctrine operates, namely the right to a hearing (or audi altercon partem) and the rule 
against bias (or nemo iudex in sua causa potest). Additionally, the topics of giving reasons 
for decisions and of consultation with people who will be affected by decisions are
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sometimes said by the courts to (all within the general concept of " f^ e ss" , even though
they fall outwith the doctrine of natural justice.
Each of these matters will be elaborated and illustrated in the context of judicial
review, before turning to the local ombudsman's approach to comparable situations.
2. The Right to a Hearing - Audi Alteram Partem
Any discussion of the right to a hearing must begin with the observation that, despite the 
apparent meaning of the term "hearing", it is well-established that orality is by no means 
always necessary; All that is required is the opportunity to put one's case.* It might seem 
obvious that the right to a hearing necessarily carries with it the right to receive adequate 
notice of the hearing, since a hearing which is not preceded by sufficient time to allow for 
the preparation of the case is tantamount to the denial of a hearing altogether. In practice, 
however, the courts view cases of foilure to give notice differently aecording to whether the
failure results from fault on the part of the decision-maker.
In Glynn v. Keele University^^ the High Court found a breach of natural justice 
where notification of disciplinary proceedings was sent to a student's term-time address 
after he had gone down for the long vacation. " However, it is important to note that the 
reasoning in the case turned on the fact that it would have been easy for the notice to have 
been sent to both the student's home and college addresses. In other words, the case is not 
an example of non-notification simpliciter, but of non-notification caused by fault on the 
part of the decision-maker. The importance of this distinction is illustrated by Al-Mehdawi 
V. Secretary o f State for the Home Departments^ where the Home Secretary gave a
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deportee's solicitors notice of a hearing which was central to the deportation procedure, but 
due to a breakdown in eommunieation between the solicitors and the deportee, the latter 
was not informed. The House of Lords held that there had been no breach of natural 
justice, since the non-notification was not the decision-maker's fault.
3. The Rule Against Bias - Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa Potest
(a) Introduction
Although it is self evident that the idea of faimess requires an absence of bias on the part of 
the decision-maker, the task of deciding what constitutes bias can raise significant 
difficulties in practice. An important preliminary, however, is to note that a finding of bias 
is by no means synonymous with a finding of dishonesty. As Devlin LJ said in/?, v 
Barnsley Licensing Justices ex parte Barnsley & District Licensed Victuallers 
Association}^
"Bias is or may be an unconscious thing and a man may honestly say that he was not 
actually biased and did not allow his interest to affect his mind, although, 
nevertheless, he may have allowed it unconsciously to do so.
(b) The Tests for Identifying Bias
Traditionally, English law has used two tests for identifying bias, namely reasonable 
suspicion, and real likelihood. The appUcation of these two tests caused a great deal of
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confusion: All that could be said with any certainty was that the use of the reasonable 
suspicion test was more likely to produce a finding of bias, while the use of the real 
/fAe/zAoodf test was less likely to do so "
In /?. V. Gough}^ the House of Lords sought to clarify the test for bias. The 
appellant had been convicted of conspiring with his brother to commit certain robberies.
One of the jurors was the next-door-neighbour of the brother who was not tried. The 
House of Lords refused to intervene, saying that in all cases of alleged bias the test to be 
applied was whether, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, there was a real 
danger of injustice resulting firom the bias. Moreover, the same test was applicable whether 
the decision-maker was a bench of justices, an inferior, tribunal, a jury of an arbitrator. In a 
case involving an allegation of bias on the part of a justices' clerk, the court should go 
further and consider Wiether the clerk had been invited to advise the justices, and, if so, 
whether there was a real danger of the clerk's bias having infected the views of the justices 
to the detriment of the person concerned.
Lord Woolf specifically acknowledged that cases involving pecuniary or
proprietary interests'^ were in a category of their own, but considered the creation of any
other special categories to be undesirable.
While R  V. Gough was clearly intended to simplify the law relating to bias, its
effect was to create a further period of uncertainty. The difficulty was that although the 
House said the uniform test was to be applied in all cases except those involving pecuniary 
interests, the examples which were given were all drawn firom judicial, or quasi-judicial, 
contexts. It would, therefore, be consistent with the first principles of legal method for
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subsequent courts to confine the unifonn test to those contexts. However, m R v .
Secretary o f State fo r the Environment ex parte Kirkstall Valley Campaign Ltd}^ Sedley J 
said there was
"nothing in the jurisprudence of i t  v. Gough which necessarily limited to judicial 
and quasi-judicial tribunals the rule against participation of a person with a personal 
interest in the outcome"
and that, as a matter of principle, it should not be limited in that way
"because in the modem state the interests of individuals or of the public might be 
more radically affected by administrative decisions than by the decisions of courts 
and judicial tribunals . "
TWs decision has endorsed the simplifying effect of R  Gough in terms of the
formulation of the test for bias, but the q)plication of the concept to specific facts remains 
problematic, as the case of/?, v. HM . Coroner fo r Inner West London ex parte Dallaglio 
andLockwood-Crofts^ shows. A coroner dealing with a large-scale disaster involving over 
50 deaths, had refused to re-open an inquest which he had previously adjoumed, despite 
having been subjected to considerable pressure fi’om the relatives of some of the deceased 
to do so.“  When gi\ing an interview to a journalist, he described the mother of one of the 
deceased as "unhinged". Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal agreed that the
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R  V. Gough test of real danger was applicable, but on the facts the High Court did not find 
that test satisfied whereas the Court of Appeal did, saying that the coroner's choice of 
vbcabulsuy was not merely injudicious and insensitive, but was bound to be interpreted 
both m  a gratuitous insult, and as an indication that the coroner regarded the mother as 
unreliable.
The test of wa/bhwger is, therrfore of very widespread application, but it will be 
remembered that, inÆ r. Gough itself, Lord Woolf acknowledged that cases where the 
decision-maker has a pecuniary interest in the decision rmnain in a category of their own, 
and therefore this category must now be considered,
(c) Bias and Pecuniary Interests
The classic case where a finding of bias stemmed fi’om the decision-maker's pecumary 
interest in the subject matter of the decision is Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Co?' The 
parties had beoi involved in a long series of cases, and on three occasions the Lord 
Chancellor^ Lord Cottenhain, was on the bench. Dimes subsequently discovered that Lord 
Cottenham held shares in the company. The House of Lords held that this was a breach of 
natural justice, even though no-one would seriously think that the Lord Chancellor's 
judgment had been affected. Similarly, m R v .  Rdnd “  Blackburn J said:
"There is no doubt that any direct pecuniary interest, however small does
disqualify a person fi’om acting as a judge in the matter.
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However, there is some, more modem, evidence that the courts may adopt a 
more relaxed attitude. In/?, v. Mulvihilf^ a judge who was hearing charges involving 
conspiracy to rob certain banks and building societies Ailed to disclose his ownership of 
1650 shares in one of the banks. The Court of Appeal, being colled upon to decide whether 
this shareholding constituted a breach of the rule against bias, said that the judge had had 
no direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the criminal proceedmgs, and therefore the 
principle of autoimatio disqualification did not apply. It is significant to note that Brooke J, 
giving the judgment of the court, drew a distinction between the role of the judge in a jury 
trial, and the role of a lay justice:
"A lay justice ... is one of the primary decision makers in summary proceedings in a 
magistrates' court; and although [the judge] had to make direct decisions on the 
admissibility of evidence during the course of trials within a trial, we do not 
consider that the hypothetical reasonable bystander would reasonably suspect that it 
was not possible for him to reach a fair decision because of the existence of his 
shareholding."
The implication that a stricter test (presumably expressed in more traditional 
terms) will be appropriate in cases decided by lay magistrates is clear. The courts have not 
yet had the opportunity to say whether a similarly strict test would be appropriate whore 
the decision malcers are councillors, but evidence to suggest that this may be so may be
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derived from a comparison with the judicial approach to the provisions which impose 
criminal liability on councillors who fail to declare pecuniary interests.”
4. Giving Reasons for Decisions
Although a requirement that decision-makers should give reasons for their decisions did not 
(and still does not) form part of the traditional doctrine of natural justice, the courts are 
becoming increasingly aware that in some oa%s aieh a requirement may contribute to the 
overall requirement of faimess in various ways. In the words of Sedley J:
"The giving of reasons may among other tilings concentrate the decision-maker's 
mind on the right questions; demonstrate to the recipient that this is so; show that 
the issues have been conscientiously addressed and how the result has been reached; 
or alternatively alert the recipient to a justiciable flaw in the process."”
In the same case, however, Sedley J recognized that a requirement to give 
reasons might not be universally appropriate:
"On the other side of the argument, it may place an undue burden on 
decision-makers; demand an appearance of unammity where there is diversity; call 
for the articulation of sometimes inexpressible value judgments; and offer an 
invitation to the captious to comb the reasons for previously unsuspected grounds 
of challenge. It is the relationship of these and other material considerations to the
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nature of the particular decision which will determine whether or not faimess 
demands reasons.
"In the light of such factors each case will come to rest between two poles, or 
possibly at one of them; the decision which cries out for reasons, and the decision 
for which reasons are entirely inapposite .,. No doubt the common law will 
develop, as the common law does, case by case. It is not entirely satisfiietory that 
this should be so, not least because experience suggests that in the absence of a 
prior principle irreconcilable or inconsistent decisions will emerge. But from the 
tenor of the decisions principles will come, and if the common law's pragmatism has 
a virtue, it is that these principles are likely to be robust."
The question of whether there is a legal requirement to give reasons must, therefore, be 
decided on a case-byrcase basis.
5. Conclusion
The courts use the doctrine of natural justice as a well-established and flexible means of 
imposing at least a minimum standard of procedural faimess on decision-makers.
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C: THE LOCAL OMBUDSMAN
1. Faimess in Relation to the Local Ombudsman Generally
The local ombudsman's function shares with judicial review the general aim of providing a 
remedy for procedural unfairness It is, therefore, not surprising that the local ombudsman 
has developed the concept of maladministration with consequential injustice in much the 
same way as the courts have developed the concept of natural justice, and that a substantial 
proportion of complaints to the local ombudsman arise from situations involving the same 
kind of specific unfairnesses as those which give rise to applications for judicial review.
2. The Right to a Hearing
The report into an investigation on a complaint against Wirral Metropolitan Borough 
Council ”  provides a striking parallel with the case oiAl-Mehdawi}* The complaint 
involved a child's exclusion from school, coupled with the local education authority's failure 
either to take proper steps to provide an alternative place or to enable an fq)peal to be made 
against the exclusion. The school sent the child's mother two letters informing her that the 
child had been excluded, and that no date had been set for her re-instatement, but that the 
governors were going to consider indefimte exclusion. The local education authority wrote 
to her asking for her comments before a decision was taken as to when the child should 
return to school. The local ombudsman had no evidence on which to reject the mother's 
claim that she did not receive any of these letters, but refused to say that the feet that she
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may not have done so was the result of any maladministration by the local education 
authority.
3. The Rule Against Bias
Much of the local ombudsman's work in relation to bias centres on the National Code o f 
Local Government Conduct}^ but some points may be made from a broader perspective 
The firrt National Code o f Local Government Conduct was introduced in 1975 
on an extra-legal basis. In 1986 the Widdicombe Report”  recommended that the Code 
should be revised and put on a statutory footing, with councillors having to agree to abide 
by it when they make their declaration of acceptance of office. This was implemented by 
the Local Government and Housing Act 1989?' and a revised code was issued in 1990.“  
As a matter of law, no remedy arises from a breach of the Code/zer - unless 
the circumstances constituting the breach would give rise to a remedy anyway - but para.9 
of the Circular under cover of which the Code was issued, provides that the local 
ombudsman may regard a breach as being maladministration.
Paragraph 8 of the Code reminds councillors of the legal provisions relating to 
disclosure of pecuniary interests, and paras.9 to 12 go on to deal with non-pecuniary 
interests and their consequences. Paragraphs 15 to 18 explain that, by analogy with the 
provisions relating to pecuniary interests, it may still be proper for a councillor to continue 
to take part, notwithstanding a relevant interest.
A number of reports illustrate the local ombudsman's use of the Code. In the 
report into an investigation on a complaint zgdmsX Melton Mowbray Borough Council}^
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the local ombudsman said that where an apphcant for planning permission is a freemason, 
any councillor dealing with that application who is not only a freemason but is also a 
member of the same lodge as the apphcant, should consider himself to have a 
non-pecuniary interest in the determination of the appUcation.
In the report into an investigation on a complaint against Kirklees Metropolitan 
Council ^  the local ombudsman took the view that there was no pecuniary interest within 
the meaning of the 1972 Act where a councillor's spouse was receiving a pension from an 
apphcant for planning permission,^  ^but that the Code apphed nevertheless, because the 
existence of the connection could result in other people thinking that the councillor was 
acting from personal motives
It is clear, therefore, that the Code takes a broad view of what amounts to a 
disqualifying interest, but the local ombudsman has nevertheless found maladministration 
where the interest in question has M en outside the scope of the Code For example, the 
complaint against Holdemess Borough Council ^  arose where a planning officer had 
recommended approval of planning permission for certain proposed development on land 
adjoining his own house. The applicant for planning permission was also the barber who 
cut the planning officer’s hair. When the application was granted, a neighbour complained 
to the local ombudsman, alleging failure to declare interests on the part of both the planning 
officer and a member of the committee. On the facts, the local ombudsman rejected the 
all^ation against the member. With regard to the planning officer, the local ombudsman 
took no objection to existence of the barber-customer relationship, but did say that the
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planning officer should have taken no part in the processing of the application, even though
his recommendation wm, if anything, against his own interest. 37
4. Giving Reasons for Decisions
The local ombudsman considers the giving of reasons to be one of the requirements of 
good administration. By way of example, there was a finding of maladministration where 
Barking & Dagenham London Borough Council failed to give reasons for not selecting an
applicant for housing accommodation.^*
There is no evidence in the local ombudsman's reports that he is following the 
courts in taking a more relaxed view of bias, and indeed, unless there is a revision of the 
the National Code of Local Government Conduct, it is difficult to see how he could do so.
D: CONCLUSION
This chapter has demonstrated that there is very substantial overlap between the activities 
of the courts in judicial review and those of the local ombudsman. Both share a recognition 
of the importance of being given notice of allegations before it is decided whether they have 
been substantiated, as well as the importance of decision-makers being fi-ee fi^ om bias. As 
far as the test for bias is concerned, the courts now apply the "real danger" test, but the
local ombudsman has not followed suit.
In relation to the giving of reasons, the distinction between the two jurisdictions
is that the local ombudsman requires the giving of reasons as a matter of course, whereas
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the courts require some particular, evidence that the demands of fairness require that
reasons should be given.
Overall, therefore, despite their basic similarities, there are important respects in 
which the local ombudsman requires a higher standard of conduct from local authorities 
than that which might satisfy the courts.
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: See ss.94-98, Local Government Act 1972 jmd s. 106, Local Government Finance
Act 1992 for members; and s. 105, Local Government Act 1972 for officers.
 ^ An important consequence of this distinction is that a criminal conviction for
breaching the duty of disclosure of interest does not affect the validity of the decision.
3 See, e.g.. Dr. Bentley's Case (1723) 1 Str 557, cited further at n.9, below.
4 By Harman LJ at the Court of Appeal stage of Ridge v. Baldwin.
 ^ See the GCHQ case, p. 5, above.
® Wade and Forsyth, Administrative Law, 7th edition, 1994, p.515.
 ^ [1949] 1 AUER 109.
* The leading case on the circumstances in which orality is necessary is R. v. Army
Board o f the Defence Council ex parte Anderson [1991] 3 All ER 375.
’ The law has developed, therefore, since Dr. Bentley's Case (1723) 1 St 557, where
Fortescue J said:
"The objection for want of notice can never be got over even God himself did not 
pass sentence upon Adam before he was caUed upon to make his defence." (The 
question of the serpent's entitlement to natural justice presumably depends on one's 
view of animal rights!)
10 [1971] 2 AUER89.
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" The Êict that the court exercised its discretion to withhold a remedy, on the ground
that the result of the disciplinary proceedings which took place in the student's absence was 
perfectly proper, does not detract from the significance of the case in the present context.
"  (1989)2 Admin LR 267.
[1960] 2 AUER703.
For a discussion of the leading authorities, see, e.g., McLeod, Judicial Review, pp. 
200-206.
[1993] 2 AUER 724 
See, p. 137, above.
" [1996] The Times, March 20.
(1995)7 Admin LR 256.
“  The coroner felt that re-opening the inquest was unnecessary because various other
legal proceedings and inquiries into the accident had occurred.
(1852) 3 HL Cas 759.
“  (1866) LR 1 QB 230.
“  There are many other cases to simUar effect: see, e.g., R. v. Gaisford [1892] 1 QB
381; Æ V. Hendon Rural District Council ex parte Chorley [1933] AU ER Rep 20, R. v. 
McAe/iz/e [1892] 2 QB 519.
"  (1989) 1 Admin LR 33.
"  For example, in Brown v. DPP [1956] 2 AUER 189 counciUors who voted against
their own pecuniary interests were convicted, on the ground that the offence is based on 
pecuniary interest and not pecuniary advantage,
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“  K V. Higher Education Funding Council ex parte Institute o f Dental Surgery
[1994] 1 AUER 651.
^  92/C/1955.
"  See, p. 133, above.
See, Appendix I, below, for the text oïihQ National Code o f Local Government
Conduct.
^  The Conduct o f Local Authority Business (Cmnd 9798)
Sections 30 and 31.
The Code was issued under cover of DoE Circular 8/90 and Welsh Office Circular 
23/90. The Local Elections (Principal Areas) (Declaration of Office) Order 1990 prescribes 
the form of declaration of office to be made by newly-elected counciUors, which includes 
the foUowing: "I undertake to be guided by the National Code of Local Government 
Conduct in the performance of my functions [in the office of counciUor]". See Appendix I 
for the fuU text of the Code.
33 87/B/789; McLeod, Local Government Ombudsman: A Casebook, p.98.
^  89/C/1909; (1991) 155 LG Rev 994
33 The local ombudsman did not address the relevance of the estabUshed legal concept
that pensions are deferred payments of wages or salary.
^  88/C/1947.
37 ç f  Brown v. DBF, n 25, for a case involving criminal liability for non-disclosure of
interest.
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88/A/2329; McLeod, Local Government Ombudsman: A Casebook, 1993, p. 114. 
Thé report makes the point that the reasons must also be minuted.
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CHAPTER6
CONCLUSION
A; SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN JUDICIAL REVIEW AND 
THE LOCAL OMBUDSMAN 
Despite âindamental differences in their origins, the processes of judicial review and 
ombudsmanship possess the common characteristic of seeking to assess the quality of the 
decision-making process without seeking to assess the quality of the ensuing decision,* 
although the courts are, of course, concerned solely with matters of law, whereas the local 
ombudsman is concerned with the broader area which may be termed public morality} 
Furthermore, both processes have a threshold of interest which a potential 
challenger or complainant must cross, and which exclude mere busybodies from 
interfering/ As a further hurdle to be overcome by applicants and complainants, the 
initiation of each process is subject to a relatively short time-limit, although in each context 
there is the possibility of extensions of time where the court or the local ombudsman, as the 
case may be, is satisfied that the interests of justice or fairness so require/*
Both processes provide what are essentially remedies of last resort. The courts' will 
refuse to entertain applications for judicial review in cases where the challenger could 
pursue remedies in respect of private law. Similarly, s. 26 o t  and Sch. V to, the Local 
Government Act 1974  ^exclude a variety of matters from the local ombudsman's 
jurisdiction, including what may generally be termed commercial matters (which will, of 
course, give rise to private law rights). It is worth noticing that, in practice, the local
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ombudsman nevertheless does deal with complaints from tenants against local authorities 
qua landlords, despite the contractual basis of the relationship .
Both the courts and the local ombudsman take the view that regard should be had 
only to those considerations which are relevant to the subject-matter of the decision 
concerned.^ In terms of their requirements as to the decision-making process itself, both 
the courts and the local ombudsman share the view that consistency is one of the elements 
of good decision-making, whilst also recognising that attitudes may change from time to 
time.^ As far as the specific needs of natural justice or frumess are concerned, both the 
courts and the local ombudsman recognise the importance of people being given notice of 
allegations before it is decided whether those allegations have been substantiated, as well as 
the importance of decision-makers being free from bias. However, the courts generally* 
take a rather more relaxed attitude to bias than that which the local ombudsman adopts.’ 
The courts may require, and the local ombudsman may recommend, that reasons 
for decision should be given, but in practice the courts will do so only where it can be 
shown that the interests of fairness so require.
Turning to the predictive value of judicial decisions and ombudsman's reports, there 
is clearly no express notion of self-bindingness on the part of the local ombudsman. 
However, there is no doubt that the formulation of principles of good administration is one 
product of the ombudsman process, and that the requirements of good decision-making 
processes include consisten<y. Since the true basis of the doctrine of precedent in the 
courts involves fidehty to principles rather than decisions,** there is a closer parallel 
between the two jurisdictions than may at first appear.
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Despite the substantial similarities which exist between judicial review and the local 
ombudsman, there are also certain clear differences. In common with most court 
proceedings, applications for judicial review are heard in public, which means that it will be 
only in exceptional circumstances that the privacy of the applicant will be respected.*^ By 
way of contrast, the local ombudsman's investigations are conducted in private, and the 
general principle is that neither the complainant nor the other people involved will be 
identified.*^
Another clear distinction between the two processes is that a complainant to the 
local ombudsman plays no part in, and has no financial responsibility for, the conduct of the 
investigation,** whereas an apphcant for judicial review may incur significant expenditure
There is also a difference between the courts and the local ombudsman in terms of 
the enforceabihty of their conclusions. Local ombudsman's reports have no enforcement 
machinery associated with them, beyond the psychological pressure which may result fi-om 
Further Reports and the possibility of the local authority being required to publish a 
statement in the local press. *" To apply the term enforcement to either of these outcomes 
would clearly be a significant overstatement. On the other hand, although court orders may 
be enforced, in practice the court may make no order, merely granting a declaration or 
simply relying oh the judgment as a statement of the law.*® In such cases, there is nothing 
to enforce, and therefore the distinction between the processes vanishes.
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B: THE FUTURE
Given the substantial, overlap between judicial review and the local ombudsman process, 
there is clearly a case for implementing the recommendation of the Woolf Report tMt the 
relationship between the two should be more formalised. However, this would almost 
certainly result in the local ombudsman developing into a sort of " small clahns court"
Before adopting this recommendation, therefore, it would be highly desirable to consider 
the extent to which it might frustrate the local ombudsman's aspiration to continue to 
develop a culture of co-operation with local authorities, in order to promote the interests of
the public at large *‘
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* See, pp.2 and 13, respectively. Although allegations of Wednesbury
unreasonableness or irrationality (in the context of the courts) and peiyersity or 
arbitrariness (in the context of the local ombudsman) necessarily involve some 
consideration of the quality of the decision.
" See, p. 14.
" See, pp.43 and 45, respectively.
* See, pp.49 and 51, respectively.
" See, p. 14.
® See, pp. 78-96.
 ^ See, esp , R. v. Birmingham City Council ex parte Sheptonhurst L td  and the report
on the investigation into a complaint against Bolsover District Council, at pp. 121 and 122, 
respectively.
* With the possible exception of cases involving pecuniary interest - see, p. 137. .
’ See, pp. 142-143.
See, pp. 139 and 144, respectively.
"  See, p.62.
"  See, p.37.
"  See, pi38.
** See, p.33.
*" See,p.38.
*® See, p.39, n.22.
*’ See, p.35.
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APPENDKI
THE NATIONAL CODE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONDUCT
The Law and standing orders
1 Councillors hold office by virtue of the law, and must at all times act within the law. You 
should make sure that you are fruniliar with the rules of personal conduct which the law and 
standing orders require, and the guidance contained in t ^  Code. It is your responsibility to 
make sure that what you do complies with these requirements and this guidance. You should 
regularly review your personal circumstances with this in mind, particularly when your . 
circumstances change. You should not at any time advocate or encourage anything to the 
contrary. If in any doubt, seek advice from your council's appropriate senior officer or from 
your own legal adviser. In the end however, the decision and the responsibility are yours.
Public duty and private interest
2 Your over-riding duty as a councillor is to the whole local community
3 You have a special duty to your constituents, including those who did not vote for you.
4 Whilst you may be strongly influenced by the views of others, and of your party in particular, 
it is your responsibility alone to decide what view to take on any question which councillors 
have to decide.
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5 If you hâve a private or personal interest in a question which councillors have to decide, you 
should never take any part in the décision, except in the special circumstances described below. 
Where such circumstances do permit you to participate, you should never let your interest 
influence the decision.
6 You should never do anything as a councillor which you would not justify to the public.
Your conduct, and what the public believes about your conduct, will affect the reputation of 
your council, and of your party if you belong to one.
7 It is not enough to avoid actual impropriety. You should at all times avoid any occasion for 
suspicion and any appearance of the improper conduct.
Disclosure of pecuniary and other interests
8 The law makes specific provision requiring you to disclose both direct and indirect pecuniary 
interests (including those of a spouse with whom you are living) which you may have in any 
matter coming before the council, a committee or a sub-committee. It prohibits you fi"om 
speaking or voting on that matter. Your council's standing orders may also require you to 
withdraw fi-om the meeting while the matter is discussed. You must also by law declare certain 
pecuniary interests in the statutory register kept for this purpose. These requirements must be 
scrupulously observed at all times..
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9 Interests which are not pecuniary can be just as important. You should not allow the 
impression to be created that you are, or may be, using your position to promote a private or 
personal interest, rather than forwarding the general pubhc interest. Private and personal 
intereists include those of your famüy and friends, as well as those arising through membership 
o t or association with, clubs, societies and other organisations such as the Freemasons, trade 
unions and voluntary bodies.
10 If you have a private or personal non-pecuniary interest in a matter arising at a local 
authority meeting, you should always disclose it, unless it is insignificant, or one which you 
share with other members of the pubhc generally as a ratepayer, a community chargepayer or an 
inhabitant of the area.
11 Where you have declared such a private or personal interest, you should decide whether it is 
clear and substantial . If it is not, then you may continue to take part in the discussion of the 
matter and may vote on it. If, however, it is a clear and substantial interest, then (except in the 
special circumstances described below) you should never take any further part in the 
proceedings, and should always withdraw from the meeting whilst the matter is being 
considered In deciding whether such an interest is clear and substantial, you should ask 
yourself whether members of the public, knowing thé facts of the situation, would reasonably 
think that you might be influenced by it. It you think so, you should regard the interest as clear
and substantial.
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12 In the following circumstances, but only in these circumstances, it can still be appropriate to 
speak, and in some cases to vote, in spite of the fact that you have declared such a clear and 
substantial private or personal interest;
(a) if your interest arises in your capacity as a member of a public body, you may speak 
and vote on matters concerning that body; for this purpose, a public body is one where, under 
the law governing declarations of pecuniary interests;, membership of the body would not 
constitute an indirect pecuniary interest;
(b) if your interest arises from being appointed by your local authority as their 
representative on the managing committee, or other governing body, of a charity, voluntary 
body or other organization formed for a public purpose (and not for the personal benefit of the 
members), you may speak and vote on matters concerning that organization;
(c) if your interest arises from being a member of the managing committee, or other 
governing body of such an organiàition, but you were not tqipointed by your local authority as 
their representative, then you may speak on matters in which that orgariization has an interest; 
you should not vote on any matter directly affecting the finances or property of that 
organization, but you may vote on other matters in which the organization has an interest;
(d) if your interest arises from being an ordinary member or supporter of such an 
organization (and you are not a member of its numaging committee or other governing body), 
then you may speak and vote on any matter in which the organization has an interest.
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Dispensations
13 Circumstances may arise where the work of your authority is affected because a number of 
councillors have personal interests (pecuniary or non-pecumary) in some question.
14 In certain circumstances, you may be able to get a dispensation to speak, and also to vote, in 
spite of a pecuniary interest. Such dispensations are given under statute by the Secretary of 
State in the case of county, regional, islands, district and London borough councils, and (in 
England and Wales) by the district council in the case of town, parish and community councils.
15 In the case of non-pecuniary interests, there may be similar exceptions to the guidance 
contained in paragraphs 9 to 12 of this Code: In the circumstances below it may be open to you 
to decide that the work of the council requires you to continue to take part in a meeting which is 
discussing a matter in which you have a clear and substantial private or personal interest.
16 Before doing so, you should
(a) take advice from the chairman of your local authority (if this is practicable) and 
from the appropriate senior officer of the authority as to vdiether the situation justifies
such a step;
(b) consider whether the public would regard your interest as so closely connected with 
the matter in question that you could not be expected to put your own interest out of 
your mind (for example, the matter might concern a decision by the council affecting a
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close relative); if you think that they would, you should never decide to take part in a
discussion of, or a vote on, the matter in question; and
(c) consider any guidance which your council has issued on this matter.
17 The circumstances in which (after such consultation and consideration) you may decide to 
speak and vote on a matter in which you have a clear and substantial private or personal 
non-pecuniary interest are if, but only i f
(a) at least half the council or committee would otherwise be required to withdraw from 
consideration of the business because they have a personal interest, or
(b) your withdrawal, together with that of any other members of the council or 
committee who may also be required to withdraw from consideration of the business 
because of a personal interest, would upset the elected party balance of the council or 
committee to such an extent that the decision is likely to be affected.
18 If you decide that you should speak or vote, notwithstanding a clear and substantial personal 
or private non-pecuniary interest, you should say at the meeting, before the matter is considered, 
that you have taken such a decision, and why.
19 The guidance set out in paragraphs 15-18 above also applies to sub-comimttees, However 
if the sub-committee is very small, or if a large proportion of members declare a personal
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interest, it will usually be more appropriate for the matter to be referred to the parent 
committee.
Disclosure in other dealings
20 You should always apply the principles about the disclosure of interests to your dealings 
with council officers, and to your unofficial relations with other councillors (at party group 
meetings, or other information occasion) no less scrupulously than at formal meetings of the 
council, committees and sub-committees.
Membership of committees and sub-committees
21 You, or some firm or body with which you are personally connected, may have professional, 
business or other personal interest within the area for which the council are responsible. Such 
interest may be substantial and closely related to the work of one or more of the council s 
committees or sub-committees. For example, the firm or body may be concerned with planning, 
developing land, council housing, personnel matters or the letting of contracts for supphes, 
services or works. You should not seek, or accept, membership of any such committee or 
sub-committee if that would involve you in disclosing an interest so often that you could be of 
little value to the committee or sub-committee, or if it would be likely to weaken public 
confidence in the duty of the committee or sub-committee to work solely in the general public
interest.
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Leadership and Chairmanship
22 You should not seek, or accept, the leadership of the council if you, or any body with which 
you are associated, has a substantial financial interest in, or is closely related to, the business or 
affairs of the council. Likewise, you should not accept the chairmanship of a committee or 
sub-committee if you have a similar interest in the business of the committee or sub-committee.
Councillors and officers
23 Both councillors and officers are servants of the public, and they are indispensable to one 
another. But their responsibilities are distinct. Councillors are responsible to the electorate and 
serve only so long as their term of office lasts. Officers are responsible to the council. Their job 
is to give advice to councillors and the council, and to carry oiit the council's work under the 
direction and control of the council, their committees and sub-committees.
24 Mutual respect between councillors and officers is essential to good local government.
Close personal femiliarity between individual councillors and officers can damage this 
relationship and prove embarrassing to other councillors and officers.
25 The law and standing orders lay down rules for the appointment, discipline and dismissal of 
staff. You must ensure that you observe these scrupulously at all times. Special rules apply to 
the appointment of assistants to pohtical groups In all other circumstances, if you are called 
upon to take part in appointing an officer, the only question you should consider is which 
candidate would best serve the whole council. You should not let your political or personal
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preferences influence your judgment. You should not canvass the support of colleagues for any 
candidate and you should resist any attempt by others to canvass yours.
Use of confidential and private inforFnation
26 As a councillor or a committee or sub-committee member, you necessarily acquire much 
information that has not yet been made public and is still confidential. It is a betrayal of trust to 
breach such confidences. You should never disclose or use confidential information for the 
personal advantage of yourself or of anyone known to you, or to the disadvantage or the 
discredit of the council or anyone else.
Gifts and hospitality
27 You should treat with extreme caution any offer or gift, favour or hospitality that is made to 
you personally. The person or organization making ffie offer may be doing, or seeking to do, 
business with the council, or may be applying to the council for planning permission or some 
other kind of decision.
28 There are no hard or fast rules about the acceptance or refusal of hospitality or tokens of 
goodwill. For example, working lunches may be a proper way of doing business, provided that 
they are approved by the local authority and that no extravagance is involved. Likewise, it may 
be reasonable for a member to represent the council at a social function or event organized by 
outside persons or bodies.
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29 You are personally responsible for all decisions connected with the acceptance or offer of 
gifts or hospitality and for avoiding the risk of damage to pubhc confidence in local government. 
The offer or receipt of gifts or invitations should always be reported to the appropriate senior 
officer of the council .
Expenses and allowances
30 There are rules enabling you to claim expenses and allowances in connection with your 
duties as a councillor or a committee or sub-committee member. These rules must be 
scrupulously observed.
Dealings with the council
31 You may have dealings with the council on a personal level, for instance as a ratepayer or 
community chargepayer, as a tenant, or as an apphcant for a grant or a planning permission.
You should never seek or accept preferential treatment in those dealings because of your 
position as a counciUor or a committee or sub-committee member. You should also avoid 
placing yourself in a position that could lead the pubhc to think that you are receiving 
preferential treatment: for instance, by being in substantial arrears to the council, or by using 
your position to discuss a planning apphcation personaUy with officers when other members of 
the pubhc would not have the opportunity to do so Likewise, you should never use your 
position as a counciUor or a committee or sub-committee member to seek preferential treatment 
for friends or relatives, or any firm or body with which you are persoiiaUy connected.
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Use o f council facilities
32 You should always make sure that any facilities (such as transport, stationery, or secretarial 
services) provided by-the council for your use in your duties as a councillor Or a committee or 
subKX)mmittee member are used strictly for those duties and for no other purpose.
Appointments to other bodies
33 You may be appointed or nominated by your council as a member of another body or 
organization - for instance, to a joint authority or a voluntary organization. You should always 
observe this Code in carrying out your duties on that body in the same way you would with 
your Own authority.
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APPENDIX n  
TABLE OF OUTCOMES OF FURTHER REPORTS 
(COMPILED FROM THE ANNUAL REPORTS FOR 1989-90 TO 1995-96)
KEY: S = Local Ombudsman Satisfied; US = Local Ombudsman Unsatisfied;
AS = Satisfection Awaited; LAPS = Local Authority Published
Statement in Local Press;
LOPS = Local Ombudsman Published Statement in Local Press
US AS LAST LOST
1989-90 12
1990-91 15 11
1991-92 15
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95 17
1995-96
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